46 210. In effect, as observed in the proven facts, when deciding those claims that it had agreed to hear in the two cassation motions, the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation only addressed issues like the application of Article 4 of Law 22,278 and the question of whether the decision relied on sufficient legal grounds or was arbitrary. 211. The Commission observes that the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation precluded any review of a considerable portion of the arguments raised in the cassation motions. As previously observed, the existing standards require that any review of an adverse judgment should be broad in scope. Therefore, the Commission deems that the right to appeal the judgment was violated by the fact that the victims were unable to obtain a review of matters of fact and the weighing of the evidence. 212. As for the challenges that the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation declared admissible and the cassation motion filed by the Juvenile Public Defenders Office, the Chamber confined itself to determining whether the ruling being challenged was duly reasoned and whether the minimum requirements established in Article 4 of Law 22,278 had been satisfied. The National Chamber of Criminal Cassation did not evaluate the reasons given to justify the imposition of sentences of life imprisonment and confinement for life, respectively, considering the authorities given the court under Article 4 of Law 22,278 and the particular circumstances of both victims. Both issues were raised in the cassation motions. As happened in the case of César Alberto Mendoza, the narrow definition of reviewable issues is incompatible with the scope of review required under Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. 213. Based on the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the State violated, to the detriment of Lucas Matías Mendoza and Claudio David Núñez, the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations undertaken in articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. 2.3 Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal 214. As recounted in the proven facts, the court-appointed defense attorney representing Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal filed a cassation motion to challenge his sentence, which the Mendoza Supreme Court denied on August 5, 2002. The Commission does not have a copy of the motion filed. However, judging from the ruling delivered by the Mendoza Supreme Court, it appears that the issues raised mainly concerned the fact that the court a quo did not take into consideration the progress that Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal had made during his remedial custodial treatment, with the result that the judgment did not lay out the legal grounds for its finding in this regard. 215. The Mendoza Supreme Court denied the motion on the grounds that defense counsel was actually seeking a review of matters of fact and of evidence, which were inadmissible given the limited range of issues that cassation motions could address. Specifically, the court asserted that the judgment did cite legal grounds and that “[t]he famous cassation motion actually has a very narrow sphere of application that is limited to matters of law; in other words, a cassation motion only examines whether the judgment correctly applies the law, in both formal and substantive aspects. Therefore, issues having to do with the determination of the factual circumstances and the weighing of evidence cannot be addressed by 154 means of a cassation motion, except in cases of alleged arbitrariness.” The Mendoza Supreme Court also asserted that the judgment was based on legal grounds. 216. Arguments like those used by the Mendoza Supreme Court limit the scope of a review by precluding allegations related to matters of fact and the weighing of the evidence. As observed in the preceding section, these restrictions are incompatible with the right to appeal a judgment. 217. As in the previous cases, when it came to the arguments regarding the legal basis for the judgment, the Mendoza Supreme Court simply transcribed certain passages of the judgment but did not evaluate them. The Commission already determined that this narrow review, limited to ascertaining whether or not the judgment had a legal basis without examining the claims asserting that the judgment’s 154 Original petition filed on behalf of Saúl Cristián Roldán Cajal and received on August 15, 2003. Attachment 2. Court Rulings. Judgment of the Mendoza Supreme Court of June 25, 2003, Case No. 73.771.