48 225. Given the more general scope of these conclusions, the Commission must not fail to mention the progress made subsequent to the rulings analyzed in the preceding paragraphs. The Commission draws particular attention to a ruling delivered by the Argentine Supreme Court on September 20, 2005, known as “the Casal judgment.” 226. As observed in the section on proven facts, in the Casal judgment the Supreme Court of the Nation examined the judicial practice of the Argentine courts -especially the Chamber of Criminal Cassation- of narrowly interpreting the rules governing the cassation motion. That narrow interpretation had meant that cassation motions seeking a review of matters of fact and the weighing of evidence were routinely denied. Taking into account the relevant provisions of international human rights law and with an express reference to Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention and Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Argentine Supreme Court held that the narrow interpretation had to change in favor of one that was broader and not confined to matters of law; instead, the review should also address matters of fact and the weighing of evidence, with the proviso that the review would 155 be the exclusive purview of those who had served as judges in the oral proceedings. 227. The Commission welcomes the Casal judgment and regards it as a first step toward reconciling judicial practices with Argentina’s international obligations in the area of human rights. Of particular importance is the Supreme Court’s clarification to the effect that the distinction between matters of fact and of law ought not to be the decisive factor in determining whether a cassation motion is the proper remedy. The only limitation contemplated in the Casal judgment concerns evidence that was taken up directly by the judge present for the oral arguments, which is for most part testimony. Thus, and when compared to the events in the case sub judice, the Casal judgment opens up the scope of the review that cassation motions seek. 228. However, the information available suggests that the ruling has not yet triggered the kind of change necessary to solve the problems singled out in this analysis. The Commission cannot yet conclude that the State has corrected this problem in Argentina; the main obstacle for the State is the fact that the Casal judgment is not binding. The Commission notes that the Supreme Court of the Nation refrained from declaring unconstitutional Article 456 of the National Code of Criminal Procedure –the article that determines the causes for which a cassation motion may be filed and which is the same in Article 474 of the Mendoza Provincial Code of Criminal Procedure. While the Casal judgment might be useful for interpretation 155 Some relevant passages of the judgment follow: Arts. 8(2)(h) of the American Convention and 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be interpreted as requiring review of any issue not exclusively reserved for those judges on the bench for the oral proceedings. This is the only aspect that cassation judges cannot review, not just because it would negate the principle of publicity [whereby proceedings are to be open], but also because cassation judges do not have firsthand knowledge of the oral proceedings; in other words, there is a real limit on what cassation judges know. It is a concrete limitation, imposed by the nature of things and must be assessed in each case. (…) While it is true that this has to be established on a case-by-case basis, the fact is that, in general, the firsthand knowledge that one has by virtue of the immediacy principle does not provide that much of an advantage. As a rule, much of the evidence in a case is in writing, either in the form of documents or expert reports. Thus information one learns by virtue of the immediacy principle generally boils down to witness testimony. (…) Summarizing, Article 456 of the National Code of Criminal Procedure should be understood as enabling a full review of the judgment, one that is as extensive as possible, requiring that cassation judges put out the maximum review effort, according to the possibilities and records of each case and without making too much of those issues that are reserved for the judges who were present for the oral proceedings, which is inevitable because oral proceedings are now the rule and the nature of things. That understanding is the result of […] (b) the fact that it is impossible in practice to draw a distinction between matters of law and of fact without venturing into the realm of selective arbitrariness (…).