2 participate as candidates in the elections or that the latter must participate through political parties (para. 218). (4) Based on these considerations (emphasis added), the restriction imposed constituted an undue limitation of the exercise of a political right, “taking into account the circumstances of the instant case, which are not necessarily comparable to all the circumstances of all political groups that may be present in other national societies or sectors of a national society” (para. 219). “[A]ny requirement for political participation designed for political parties, which cannot be fulfilled by groups with a different form of organization, is also contrary to Articles 23 and 24 of the American Convention” (para. 220). In my understanding, the ratio described in point (4) supra is an unnecessarily indirect and potentially confusing interpretation of the nature of the right embodied in Article 23(1)(b), the language and purpose of which could not be more clear. A “citizen” – who must obviously be an “individual” and not a group, in the terms of Article 1(2) – has an absolute right “to vote and be elected” in democratic elections, as established in the said article. In this way, any requirement that a “citizen” must be a member of a political party or of any other form of political organization to exercise that right clearly violates both the spirit and letter of the norm in question. It is completely irrelevant whether that requirement can or cannot be “complied with by groups with a different form of organization,” such as YATAMA in the instant case. It is the individual right of the individual “citizen” that is proclaimed and must be protected by the Court. I am concerned that by including questions of culture, customs and traditional forms of organization in its ruling on this issue, the Court is running the risk of reducing the protection that should be available to every “citizen” under the jurisdiction of every State, irrespective of his culture, customs or traditional forms of association. Consequently, in my opinion, merely by imposing the requirement under discussion, the State violated the right of the members of YATAMA to vote and be elected. My opinion is supported by a careful reading of the relevant sections of the travaux préparatoires of the Convention. From these, it is clear that the Conference that drafted and adopted the Convention specifically rejected a proposal that could have included in the current Article 23(1), a right to belong to political parties, the activities of which would be “protected” by law. It would be a great shame if this judgment of the Court opens the way to interpretations of this important article that the authors of the Convention, in their wisdom, made an effort to exclude.