25 70. Concerning the nature of the civil patrols, the Commission pointed out that, under the law by which they were regulated, they were hierarchically subordinate to the Guatemalan Ministry of National Defense, and that such subordination to the armed forces was not merely statutory, but de facto as well. The civil patrols "received the training needed to perform their duties from the Army... the weapons they [bore were] the property of the Army... and weapons and munitions alike [were] controlled by the Army." 71. The Commission adduced "the close connection" between the civil patrols and the State, highlighting a series of shared characteristics. It pointed out, first of all, that the State had indeed created the patrols as part of its counterinsurgency strategy, a fact corroborated by the studies prepared by the Commission, in particular its Annual Report for 1984-1985, and that they involved the rural and indigenous population in the armed conflict. Moreover, it indicated that they were supervised, trained and armed by the State and that Decree-Law 19-86 of January 10, 1986, had legally recognized the civil patrols after years of operation and described them as "auxiliary forces coordinated by the Ministry of Defense." 72. In this case, the Commission maintained that the El Llano Civil Patrol took orders directly from Guatemalan Army personnel, since the patrolmen sought and received instructions from the military personnel of the Las Majadas garrison when they detained Nicholas Blake (supra 52(a)). 73. The State rejected the argument that the members of the civil patrols were agents of the State and that it was responsible on the basis of that premise. It further stated that the civil patrols were voluntary community organizations that had sprung up in areas of conflict and that they were composed of inhabitants of those areas who wished to defend their lives, those of their families and their belongings from subversive elements. It pointed out that it was natural for those patrols to have close links with the Army in connection with the antisubversion struggle, but that this did not imply that "its members belong[ed], or [performed] the same functions as the Armed Forces and that they [were] agents of the Guatemalan State." 74. The State declared that it did not grant members of the patrols any remuneration or social security benefits as it did to regular troops. It further stated that its members were not subject to military discipline and performed their patrol duties in their free time, when not engaged in their own work. * * * 75. The Court considers that, contrary to Guatemala's claims, the civil patrols in fact acted as agents of the State during the period in which the acts pertaining to the instant case occurred (supra 52. (p)). That view was confirmed by a mass of information and documentation available from various bodies, including international human rights oversight organs (Decree-Law 19-86 of January 10, 1986; Decree 143-96 of the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala of November 28, 1996; Peace Agreements, 1996-1998; Agreement on the Strengthening of the Civil Authority and Function of the Army in a Democratic Society, of September 19, 1996; Persecution by Proxy: The Civil Patrols in Guatemala, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1993; Institutional Violence: The Civil Self-Defense Patrols in Guatemala, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1994; Civil Patrols in Guatemala, an Americas Watch Report, 1988; Closing the Space: Country Reports on Human Rights