3 supervision so as to assure the most effective protection possible of the guaranteed human rights. 11. In the instant case of Loayza Tamayo, the Commission had pointed out the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies and declared the petition or communication admissible (case No. 11.154, Report 20/94, of 26 September 1994, pp. 14-16 and 31). As the dossier of the case reveals and the public hearing before the Court of 23 September 1995 confirms, the question was only brought up by the Government of Peru in an advanced stage of the proceedings before the Commission 4 in the period of the consideration of the preparation of the Commission’s Report on the case (above mentioned document), beyond the time limit (and not in limine litis ), and, even so, not as a preliminary objection of admissibility proper but rather as de facto information on proceedings pending in the domestic jurisdiction. 5 12. The act of pointing out, as a fact and in an extemporaneous manner, the existence of judicial proceedings pending in the domestic courts is not the same as expressly objecting to, on the basis of this fact, the admissibility and examination of the case by the Commission on the international level. In its brief of 15 March 1995 on the preliminary objection presented to the Court, the Government of Peru expressly states that it had not formally interposed to the Commission, the objection, as such, of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 6 Moreover, as the present judgment rightly sets forth, there is no way to prolong indefinitely in time the opportunity granted to the respondent Government to raise a preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, 7 which exists primarily for its benefit at the stage of admissibility of the petition. 13. The decision of the Commission regarding the admissibility should be considered definitive, impeding the Government to reopen it, and the Court to review it, since, in the present case, the preliminary objection in question was not even raised by the respondent Government in due time (in limine litis) for the decision of the Commission. This basis alone is sufficient to reject the preliminary objection interposed by the respondent Government. Given the circumstances of the present case of Loayza Tamayo, the objection of the alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be rejected on the basis of its extemporaneous nature and the tacit waiver before the Commission, and the estoppel (forclusion) before the Court. 8 4 5 Hearing of 16 September 1994 before the Commission. The Government only raised the preliminary objection as such before the Commission in its brief of 23 November 1994 (Report prepared by a Working Group), when the Commission’s Report containing its decision on the case had already been adopted. 6 Page 12 of the Government of Peru’s brief; cf. also the briefs of the Commission of 24 and 25 May 1995. 7 This objection could hardly be interposed before the Court under Article 31(1) of its Rules of Procedure: the scope of this provision is limited, as it does not cover the issue under examination, and is restricted to purely procedural aspects. 8 Under the European Convention on Human Rights, according to the jurisprudence constante of the European Court of Human Rights, the respondent Government who failed to raise an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies previously before the Commission, is prevented from raising it before the Court (estoppel). The European Court has ruled to this effect, inter alia, in the cases of Artico (1980), Corigliano (1982), Foti (1982) and Ciulla (1989), concerning Italy; Granger (1990), concerning the United Kingdom; Bozano (1986), concerning France; De Jong, Blajet and Van der Brink (1984), concerning Holland; and Bricmont (1989), concerning Belgium. In its Judgment of 22 May 1984, in the Van der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and Klappe case, concerning Holland, the European Court went