87 definitive end to the extradition process, in defiance of the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Rather than take the measures required to comply with the court ruling, the Executive Branch launched a series of measures to reverse the Constitutional Court’s decision by turning to various court authorities seeking “interpretations” and “clarifications” of the sense of the ruling. As observed in the section on established facts, in briefs dated November 25, 2011 and November 28, 2011, the Prosecutors Offices under the Executive Branch filed briefs with the Judicial Branch to make the case for how Mr. Wong Ho Wing could be extradited without violating the Constitutional Court’s ruling. In response, a number of judicial authorities ruled that the meaning of a definitive judgment cannot be changed. The enforcement process ended up in the Constitutional Court yet again, which on March 12, 2013 ruled that any clarification of its previous judgment was out of order and declared that the Executive Branch was looking for a way to change the sense of the judgment. 285. Another measure taken by the Executive Branch to delay enforcement of the Constitutional Court’s ruling was a January 9, 2012 request to the Supreme Court seeking an additional advisory resolution in light of a supposed “new fact,” which was that death penalty for smuggling in China had been struck down. This request was denied on March 14, 2012. In its ruling the Supreme Court was emphatic in pointing out that the Constitutional Court’s ruling was definitive and that the extradition process was now in the hands of the Executive Branch. 286. It is worth noting that the Peruvian State has been justifying the use of these delaying tactics by claiming that a ruling is needed from the Judicial Branch to interpret the Constitutional Court’s judgment and establish its scope. The supposed “new fact” on which the State’s request is based is the repeal of the death penalty for one of the crimes for which Mr. Wong Ho Wing’s extradition was sought. 287. The first point that the Commission must make clear is that the so-called “new fact” was not a new fact at all. The Peruvian State learned of the repeal of the death penalty for the crime of smuggling on the very day it happened, which was February 25, 2011. This can be corroborated by listening to the audio of the hearing that the Inter-American Court held that day in connection with the provisional measures, where the Peruvian State was represented and brought that information to the attention of the Court and all parties in attendance, including the Inter-American Commission. Three months later, on May 24, 2011, the Constitutional Court issued a definitive ruling on the petition of habeas corpus; in that ruling it ordered the Executive Branch to abstain from extraditing Mr. Wong Ho Wing. It is worth noting that this habeas corpus petition had been filed and prosecuted against various authorities in the Executive Branch, including the President of the Republic, in whose hands the final extradition decision lie. Thus, the Commission cannot buy into the argument that the Constitutional Court was unaware that the death penalty for smuggling had supposedly been repealed in China. In any event, it was the obligation of the authority against whom the preventive habeas corpus petition was brought to protect the alleged victim’s rights to life and personal integrity, to bring to the attention of the Constitutional Court any information that would be relevant for purposes of adopting a decision, given the obligations to ensure those rights. 288. A second issue has to do with the content of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, which did not rely entirely on how the law in China classified the crimes and the possible application of the death penalty. A reading of that ruling shows that the Constitutional Court took other considerations into account that led it to the conclusion that Mr. Wong Ho Wing should not be extradited. Salient among these were the context-related considerations about the use of the death penalty and complaints of torture in the People’s Republic of China. Those considerations are entirely unrelated to the supposed “new fact” that the Peruvian State claimed necessitated a reinterpretation of the