90 3.1. As for the guarantee of a “reasonable time” 297. In this analysis, the Commission will consider the four elements that the case law has established to determine the reasonableness of the length of time of the proceeding: a) the complexity of the matter; b) the procedural activity of the interested party; c) the conduct of the judicial authorities,243 and d) adverse effect of the duration of proceedings on the judicial situation of the interested party.244 298. The Commission’s first observation is that with regard to the legal time frame within which an extradition process must be carried out, Peruvian law establishes only certain time periods for the first phase of the process, i.e., the phase during which the extradition question is before the courts. Thus, Article 521 of the Peruvian Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that once the person whose extradition has been requested is taken into custody and his statement taken, the Preliminary Examining Judge has up to 15 days to schedule a public hearing. After that hearing, the case file must be immediately referred to the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, which must set the date for the extradition hearing. After that hearing, the law provides that the Supreme Court shall issue an advisory resolution within five (5) days, and that within the next three (3) days it is to refer the resolution to the Ministry of Justice. Article 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not establish a time frame for the Executive Branch’s phase of the extradition process. 299. The Commission observes that the legal deadlines for the advisory process were not satisfied in this case; it also considers that the absence of any legal time frame for the Executive Branch’s final decision enabled the delay of more than four and a half years between the time the extradition request was received and the present. This same provision has allowed the Executive Branch to keep Mr. Wong Ho Wing under arrest to this day, in a kind of legal limbo, despite the Constitutional Court’s ruling in his favor, which has not been assigned the importance it is due in the extradition process. 300. As for the complexity of the matter, the Commission considers that while the extradition request in this case may have had a certain degree of complexity because of the context-related situation that made it incumbent upon the requested State to ask for adequate assurances from the requesting State, the analysis recounted in this report makes it plain that the delay was not caused by either the complexity of the case or any diligence in procuring assurances. Quite the contrary, since many of the needed assurances have not be obtained to this day. 301. As for the procedural activity of the interested parties, the Commission observes that the domestic authorities with jurisdiction to settle the present matter have long delayed the issuance of the final decision in the extradition process; instead, for the last two years they have focused their efforts on filing requests with the courts seeking clarification. Furthermore, since the time of the Constitutional Court’s most recent decision in this matter, which was on March 12, 2013, in which it reiterated that a re-interpretation of its original ruling was out of order, another four months have 243 Furlan. 152. Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, para. 77, and Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 26, 2012. Series C No. 244, para. 49. 244 Furlan. 152. Cf. Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2008. Series C No. 192, para. 155, and Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, para. 49.