75 was assessed prior to taking the decision on extradition, with reference to the facts which were known or ought to have been known at the time of the extradition.206 235. Summarizing, in this section, the Commission establishes that the absolute prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, stipulated in Article 5 of the American Convention, means that a State’s international responsibility may be engaged if it returns a persons under its jurisdiction, whether by deportation or extradition, to a country where there is a real risk that he or she may suffer torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The specific obligations that emanate from this principle will be itemized in the following chapter of this report. Because of the nature and analysis of the guarantees given by the People’s Republic of China in the present case, they are a key part of the discussion concerning the Peruvian State’s possible responsibility. The following are the main principles established by the European Court’s case law on this subject. 2.2 Specific implications of receiving and weighing diplomatic or other assurances that the death penalty will not be enforced and torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment will not be used 236. There are no precedents in the inter-American sphere that specifically concern the receiving and weighing of diplomatic or other assurances that the death penalty, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment will not be applied. The European Court has ample case law on this subject, both regarding the assurances on non-enforcement of the death penalty and regarding assurances that acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment will not be committed. 237. The Inter-American Commission understands that the various types of assurances may differ in terms of their features, or the elements used to measure the adequacy of those assurances may vary, because it is one thing to give assurances regarding a practice that is legal in the State requesting extradition (the death penalty), but another thing to give assurances with respect to a practice that is prohibited by international consensus and that is not legal in the requesting State (torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment). 238. This distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Manickavasagam Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Attorney General of Canada in the following terms: A distinction may be drawn between assurances given by a state that it will not apply the death penalty (through a legal process) and assurances by a state that it will not resort to torture (an illegal process). We would signal the difficulty in relying too heavily on assurances by a state that it will refrain from torture in the future when it has engaged in illegal torture or allowed others to do so on its territory in the past. This difficulty becomes acute in cases where torture is inflicted not only with the collusion but through the impotence of the state in controlling the behaviour of its officials. Hence the need to distinguish between assurances regarding the death penalty and assurances regarding torture. The former are easier to monitor and generally more 207 reliable than the latter. 206 European Court of Human Rights. Case of Garabayev v. Russia. Application No. 38411/02. Judgment of June 7, 2007. Final January 3x0, 2008. Para. 77 and 79. Quoting. Case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, 67-69, ECHR 2005-I. 207 Supreme Court of Canada. Manickavasagam Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Attorney General of Canada (Suresh v. Canada), 2002, SCC 1. File No. 27790, January 11, 2002. Para. 124.