12 that are involved in relation to the right to social security, and whether these are the obligation to respect this right, the obligation to ensure the right (as in the case of its progressive development), or a combination of the two. This determination is essential because it reveals that not every case involving a social right necessarily signifies only a violation of the “obligation to ensure its progressive development.”60 32. A third relevant aspect of the Muelle Flores case is that is gives us a comprehensive view of each of the violations that have occurred in each case. Even though the Court has done a commendable job with regard to the issue of pensions by incorporating violations within the content of the right to property (Article 21), as in the cases of the Five Pensioners and Acevedo Buendía, it is clear that the said right does not encompass the broader content of the right to social security;61 although the right to social security does include monetary or financial aspects (pensions), it also encompasses benefits relating to certain services that beneficiaries can access – for example, preventive or emergency medical services – that are clearly unrelated to the sphere of the protection of private property. 62 Consequently, in its judgment, the Court relates the right to social security to the right to property – without subsuming it within the latter.63 33. Each and every one of the aspects I have emphasized provides a specific argument regarding the reasons why the social rights – such as the right to social security — may validly be autonomously justiciable.64 To this should be added, as previously indicated by the InterAmerican Court, that “a literal, systematic and teleological interpretation leads to the conclusion that Article 26 of the Convention protects the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards set forth in the OAS Charter. The scope of such rights should be understood in relation to the other articles of the American Convention and they are therefore subject to the general obligations contained in Article 1(1) and 2 of the Convention and may be supervised by the Court in the terms of Articles 62 and 63 of this instrument. This conclusion is based not only on formal issues, but results from the interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, as well as their compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention, which is the protection of the fundamental rights of the human being.[…].” 65 34. This important exercise performed by the Court in interpreting the rights and also the scope of the social rights is not unrelated to its case law because, traditionally, the Court has Cf. Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, paras. 190, 191 and 202. 60 For example, in the Case of Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia, the Inter-American Court used a similar approach in relation to Article 21 of the American Convention with regard to the possibility of differentiating the right to property and the right to housing. It indicated that: “Consequently, this Court finds it necessary to make some additional clarifications regarding the inviolability of the home and privacy from the perspective of Article 11(2) of the Convention and with regard to the right to housing, the latter taking into account that, even though every home can be protected by the right to property, not all property is necessarily a home […].” Cf. Case of Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2017. Series C No. 341, para. 241. It should be pointed out that the Inter-American Court did not declare that the right to housing had been violated autonomously in that judgment. 61 Cf. UN, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19, The right to social security (Article 9), February 4, 2008, para. 2 62 Cf. Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, para. 218. 63 Cf. Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, fifth and sixth operative paragraphs and paras. 171 to 209 and 213 to 219. 64 Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359, para. 97. 65