19 has been a violation of a right derived from Article 26 in the terms of Articles 62 and 63 of the Convention.”108 50. Likewise, the Ruling adds that this “results not only from formal matters, but also from the reciprocal indivisibility and interdependence of the civil and political rights and the economic, social, cultural and environmental rights”109 and that “the interdependence and indivisibility of the rights recognized by the American Convention denies any separation, categorization or hierarchy between rights for the purposes of their respect, protection and guarantee.”110 51. In maintaining that position, the Ruling omits to mention that Article 1(1) of the Convention requires the State Parties to respect and guarantee the free exercise of the rights “recognized therein” and that Article 29 (a) of the same instrument, related to the “pro personae” principle, employs the same formula.111 Nor does it refer to other provisions of the Convention that mention “the rights established,” “guaranteed”, “enshrined” or “protected,”112 which, logically, should be understood to mean the rights that have been “recognized.”113 52. Furthermore, the Ruling does not take full account of the agreements and instruments related to the Convention, or concerning its interpretation, or the relevant practice of its States Parties. On this point, it merely evokes in a generic manner the link between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights,114 but without providing details of agreements subsequent to the signing of the Convention that reflect the interpretation made by its States Parties. Instead, the Ruling only mentions the Protocol of San Salvador, downplaying its importance by not considering the fact that it establishes that the Court can only examine two very specific situations contemplated therein, ultimately calling into question its purpose and the need for it. 115 53. Moreover, the Ruling appears to confuse the nature of subsequent agreements that the States Parties to the Convention reach or have reached. Indeed, it states that “the Court recalls that Article 76 of the American Convention establishes a specific procedure for amendments, which require the ratification of two-thirds of the States Parties to the Convention” and that, “it would be contradictory to consider that the adoption of the Additional Protocol, which did not require such a high margin of ratification as an amendment to the American Convention, could modify the content and scope of the latter’s effects.”116 Thus, in relation to the amendment and modification of treaties, pursuant to 108 Para. 84 of the Ruling. [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 109 Para. 85 of the Ruling. [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 110 Para.86 of the Ruling. [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 111 Footnote 50. 112 Para. 33, d). Hereinafter, whenever reference is made to the rights “recognized” in the Convention, it should also be understood to include those “established”, “guaranteed”, “enshrined” or “protected” therein. 113 114 Para. 85 of the Ruling[Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 115 Paras. 88 and 89 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 116 Para. 89 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral]