21 the Convention, entitled “Means of Protection.” On this point it should be noted that the Ruling does not explain or give any reason– or, at least sufficient reason - why Article 26 was included separately and as the sole article of Chapter III of the Convention, entitled “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” or why it was not included in Chapter II of Part I of the Convention, entitled “State Obligations and Rights Protected.” Moreover, it does not explain why that Chapter was not given the simple title of “Rights.” 56. In sum, the Ruling does not provide a reasonable explanation to help us understand the difference between the two chapters of Part I of the Convention. It does not provide any reason to justify the difference between the conventional regulation of civil and political rights and the economic, social and cultural rights. Obviously and logically, the basis for this cannot be other than the fact that Article 26 does not establish a human right and that, consequently, under its aegis, persons do not have the right to make a claim before the Court for the violation of a human right. 57. Finally, in relation to the systematic interpretation, it seems appropriate to emphasize that the Ruling is based solely on the Court’s own case law, 123 that is to say, on its own view. The Court even has recourse to the institution of “la compétence de la compétence” in order to affirm that it “has the inherent authority to determine the scope of its own competence.”124 Clearly, this argument is insufficient to support its position. 58. In synthesis, we must conclude that the Ruling does not, strictly speaking, make a systematic or subjective interpretation, as envisaged in the Vienna Convention. In other words, it does not carry out a harmonious interpretation between the different provisions of the Convention. Consequently, as in the case of the incorrect application of the literal method of interpretation, this leads to an inaccurate conclusion. C. Teleological or functional interpretation 59. As to the teleological method of interpretation of the Convention, while it is true that the Ruling refers to the Preamble of the Convention, it is also true that only one of the latter’s paragraphs states the object and purpose thereof, since the others contain considerations concerning the reasons for signing that instrument.125 In terms of the latter paragraph, the object and purpose of the Convention is “the incorporation into the Charter of the Organization itself of broader standards with respect to the economic, social and educational rights” and that “an inter-American convention on human rights should determine the structure, competence and procedure of the organs responsible for these matters.” 60. Therefore, it being true that “the Court has asserted that the object and purpose of the Convention is the protection of the fundamental rights of the human being,”126 a purpose shared by 123 Paras. 83 to 86 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 124 Para. 86 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 125 Footnote 44 126 Paras. 92 and 97 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral]