40 workers in his workplace.”167 It also indicated that “the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, but not to offend the honor and dignity of senior members of the employer’s company.” 130. Regarding the requirement of necessity in relation to the sanction imposed, the Court notes that the State, through the Second Labor Court, which delivered the final decision, did not consider the following fundamental elements in its analysis: (i) Mr. Lagos del Campo was a representative elected by the workers and was acting in exercise of his mandate (supra para. 108); (ii) his statements were made in the context of his functions and of an electoral debate and, consequently, were of general and collective interest; (iii) his statements were subject to enhanced protection in the exercise of his functions; (iv) the statements were not of such import that they exceeded the threshold of protection in view of the electoral and labor context, and (v) it was not proved that there was an overriding necessity to protect the rights to reputation and honor in this specific case. Even though freedom of expression was explicitly mentioned, the ruling does not indicate that either the rights in play or their consequences had been weighed in light of the requirement of necessity (supra, para. 124) (specifically established by Article 13(2) of the American Convention). Moreover, the arguments that justified the first instance decision were not disproved, in order to make it essential to reverse it. Consequently, the heavy penalty of dismissal was ratified by that court without considering these fundamental elements of special protection (supra paras. 108 and 116), so that the sanction imposed was unnecessary in the specific case. 131. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ruling of the Second Labor Court failed to state the reasons for the decision168 that would have analyzed the rights in play in light of the abovementioned elements, and would have assessed the arguments of the parties and the decision that was reversed. Therefore, the failure to provide a statement of reasons had a direct impact on due process, because that court failed to provide the legal grounds substantiating its decision to ratify the dismissal of Mr. Lagos del Campo in the context described above. 132. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State endorsed a restriction of the right to freedom of thought and expression of Mr. Lagos del Campo, by an unnecessary sanction in relation to the objective sought and without a due justification. This was because, based on the circumstances of this case, there was no overriding necessity that would have justified the dismissal of Mr. Lagos del Campo. In particular, his freedom of expression was restricted without taking into consideration that his statements referred to matters of general interest, as part of his remit, and were protected also by his capacity as a workers’ representative, as president of the Electoral Committee. Therefore, the Peruvian State violated Articles 13(2) and 8(2) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mr. Lagos del Campo. Second Labor Court of Lima. Judgment 08-0891 of August 8, 1991 (evidence file, annex 12 to the Merits Report, ff. 47 and 48). 167 According to Article 233 of the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, to ensure the proper administration of justice, it was required that, “in all the instances, a decision shall include a statement of reasons that expressly mentions the applicable law and the grounds for that decision.” Regarding the obligation to state the reasons, the Court has indicated that “it is one of the ‘due guarantees’ included in Article 8(1) to safeguard the right to due process.” “[…] It is a guarantee linked to the proper administration of justice […] that protects the right […] to be tried based on legal grounds in a democratic society.” “The decisions taken by domestic organs that may affect human rights must be duly substantiated because, to the contrary, they would be arbitrary decisions.” Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the obligation to state reasons does not require a detailed answer to every argument of the parties, but it may vary according to the nature of the decision, and must be determined in light of the circumstances of the case, so that “in each case, it is necessary to analyze whether this guarantee has been complied with.” Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 90; Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru, supra, para. 178. Cf. ECHR Case of Hiro Balani v. Spain. No. 18064/91. Judgment of December 9, 1994. Para. 27; Case of Ruiz Torija v. Spain. No. 18390/91. Judgment of December 9, 1994, para. 29; Case of Suominen v. Finland. No. 49684/99. Judgment of September 27, 2011, and Case of Hirvisaari v. Finland No. 49684/99. Judgment of September 27, 2011, para. 30. 168