32 96. This is why, the Court reaffirms that, the sphere of protection of the right to freedom of thought and expression is particularly applicable to workplace contexts such as in the instant case, and in such contexts the State must not only respect this right, but also guarantee it, so that the workers or their representatives may also exercise it. Thus, should a general or public interest be involved, a higher degree of protection of freedom of expression is required; 123 particularly with regard to those who have a mandate to represent others. 97. The Court will therefore ascertain whether, in this case, in relation to preservation of the rights alleged by the presumed victim, the second instance decision endorsing his dismissal constituted a violation of freedom of expression in the context of labor relations.124 1.2 Analysis of the necessity and reasonableness of the restriction in this case 98. The Court has repeatedly indicated that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 13(2) of the Convention, which prohibits prior censorship, also establishes the possibility of the subsequent imposition of liability for the abusive exercise of this right, including to ensure “respect for the rights or reputations of others” (subparagraph (a) of Article 13(2)). These restrictions are of an exceptional nature and should not limit, beyond strictly necessary, the full exercise of freedom of expression and become a direct or indirect means of prior censorship.125 Thus, the Court has established that liability may be imposed subsequently if the right to honor and reputation may have been affected.126 99. Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to the protection of his honor and recognition of his dignity. The Court has indicated that the right to honor “recognizes that everyone has the right to have their honor respected, prohibits any unlawful attack on honor and reputation, and imposes on States the obligation to provide the protection of the law against such attacks. In general. The Court has indicated that the right to honor relates to self-esteem and self-worth, while the right to reputation relate to the opinion that others have of a person.”127 100. In this regard, the Court has maintained that, “both freedom of expression and the right to honor, rights protected by the Convention, are extremely important, thus the two rights must be guaranteed, so that they may coexist harmoniously.”128 Each fundamental right must be exercised respecting and safeguarding the other fundamental rights.129 Consequently, the Court has indicated that “any conflict between the two rights requires that they be weighed and, to this end, each case must be examined taking into account its characteristics and circumstances in order to assess the existence and intensity of the elements on which the said opinion is based.”130 para. 34, and Case of Remuszko v. Poland, No. 1562/10. Judgment of July 16, 2013, para. 83. 123 Cf. ECHR, Case of Csánics v. Hungary, No. 12188/06. Judgment of January 20, 2009, para. 441. 124 Cf. ECHR, Case of Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GS], supra, para. 61. Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 120, and Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 110. 125 Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 123. 126 Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 57, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacres v. Colombia, supra, para. 286. 127 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177 para. 51, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 127. 128 129 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 75, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 127. 130 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51, and Case of Granier et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 144.