35 to pay the corresponding sums within no more than six months and to pay delinquency interest in the event of nonpayment. The State’s arguments In its various interventions during the process, the State made the following points: a) With regard to material damages, the State’s contention was that Mr. José María Cantos was “duly heard in a proceeding that he instituted for that very purposes, and the ruling obtained was based on law.” It argued further that in Argentina filing fees are a percentage of the amount of relief the plaintiff is seeking. It argued that the State did not violate Mr. Cantos’ right to property when it ordered him to pay costs in his case before the Supreme Court. It also pointed that that as the 1982 agreement was nullified in the Supreme Court’s September 3, 1996 ruling, its clauses do not constitute an acknowledgment by public officials of a debt owed; quite the contrary, this allegation is an attempt to “include within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court facts for which the Court itself declared it did not have jurisdiction.” The State reasoned, therefore, that no material damages were owed. It also alleged that every disruption of the proceedings before the Supreme Court was the fault of Mr. Cantos, as it was he who brought a claim that had no basis in law and in which he was seeking an exorbitant amount. He was the one in charge of moving the case forward. Therefore, any damages that the judicial proceedings he instituted are alleged to have occasioned were not caused and should not be paid by the State. The State argued that based on the allegations on the merits, the Argentine State bears no responsibility; therefore, no reparations should be ordered in the instant case. b) Concerning the nonmaterial damages, the State held that the Government had rebutted the allegations of police harassment against Mr. José María Cantos and his family. It was the Government’s position that “Mr. Cantos’ family is not party to this case” and that “these facts cannot be litigated inasmuch as they occurred prior to September 5, 1984.” As to the allegations of harassment by the courts, the State contends that the record shows that no such harassment occurred. On the issue of Mr. Cantos’ life plan, it reasoned that “there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Cantos did not have one or that the State was responsible for his absence from the family home.” Therefore, as no suffering has been shown, the State argued that it would be improper for the Court to estimate moral damages, “not even the kind of token damages that the representatives of the plaintiff suggest.” c) As to other forms of reparation, the State again brought up the problems with the 1982 agreement and the rectitude of the Supreme Court’s decision. It recalled that Mr. Cantos had access to the proceedings, in accordance with the rules of due process, which is not to say that the proceedings had to turn out in his favor.