6. They indicate that, in December 1998, the prosecutor dealing with the case requested sentences of 3 years prison and 9 years disqualification from practicing medicine for the medical staff charged; nevertheless, in July 2003, the judgment acquitted them. They report that said ruling was upheld in the court of second instance and that the extraordinary federal appeal was ruled inadmissible because it was filed outside the statutory timelimits, which occurred as a result of a “ploy” used by the court’s staff when receiving the appeal, which prevented them from having access to appeal on time. They explain that, although it was filed at 9:29, the staff marked the time of receipt at 9:32 by hand, instead of using the official date stamp. 7. As for the case of the falsification of a public instrument which was filed at the same time, they allege that the stage of pre-trial investigation extended for more than four years, during which the judge hearing the case acquitted the experts being charged five times and, each time, the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Appeals overturned the decision to acquit. After the fourth acquittal was overturned, the judge hearing the case decided to request an forensic expert report from the plenary of the Medical Examiners Corps of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Cuerpo Médico Forense de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, hereinafter referred to as the “Medical Examiners Corps”) which had ruled that the expertise provided in the trial of the physicians of the Hospital Público Sardá had been correct, dismissing the possibility that there had been any medical malpractice committed. They point out that, although the expertise had been declared null and void “because of the corrupt practices” of its members, there were court proceedings and rulings that took that evidence―as well as other evidence that had been challenged―as a precedent, which would tend to establish the use of illegally obtained evidence. 8. They add that, in November 1997, the judge ordered another expert report, this time entrusted to the Catholic University of the Province of Córdoba. That expert report showed that Ms. Britez Arce died of preeclampsia-eclampsia pathology, which had not been duly diagnosed; that no treatment had been prescribed; that minimum monitoring recommendations had not been made; that she had not been correctly assessed during prenatal checkups; and that she had not been given the right medicines. Nevertheless, that expert report was used as the grounds for acquitting the experts. They indicate that recusal of the judge hearing the case was requested for “unwarranted delays,” for the “judge’s interest in the trial,” and for “prejudgment.” They note that said recusal was turned down. 9. The petitioners indicate that, in April 1998, the former spouse of Ms. Cristina Britez Arce filed a complaint against the 31 members of the Medical Examiners Corps for making false statements. In April 1999, the judge hearing the case decided to acquit the 31 physicians charged in the case. They allege that, in the appeal to this ruling, 26 essential pieces of evidence were not taken into consideration and that they were denied a duly reasoned judgment. They report that a cassation appeal was filed against this ruling and, subsequently, an appeal was filed complaining that the cassation had been denied, as well as an extraordinary federal appeal, all of them dismissed on the basis of the argument that the proceeding was confined to assessing the evidence. The petitioners assert that they were unable to have access to a comprehensive review of the judgment as stipulated by Article 8.2(h) of the Convention. 10. They allege that the impunity that the 31 members of the Medical Examiners Corps secured directly impacted the rest of the cases because the physicians accused of malpractice were acquitted and charges were dropped, as well as the experts who conducted the first expert examination. 11. They indicate that, in 1994, they filed civil proceedings for damages and it was only 18 years later that they obtained a final judgment. They state that, also in this proceeding, irregularities appeared, such as the fact that one of the physicians appointed to conduct the expertise, Dr. Barrón, although he was sworn in as an independent expert, was brought into the case on purpose because he had been an expert on the same elements of the expertise (the causes of the death of Cristina Britez and her unborn child) in March 2002 in a report produced by the Medical School of the University of Buenos Aires in the case lodged against the experts Casavilla and Poggi. They indicate that the judgment from the court of first instance was based on the expertise of that expert, who had already given his opinion on this issue. They add that, in the court of second instance, Dr. Barrón’s expertise was dispensed with, but no other expertise was taken into consideration to uphold the dismissal of the complaint. 2