2 admissible and decided to join the petitions under Article 29.1.d of the Rules of Procedure in force at the time, inasmuch as they “address similar facts.” Additionally, it noted that the facts alleged in the petitions could tend to establish violations of the rights enshrined in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 25 of the American Convention, in connection with the obligations set forth in Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof.4 5. On July 29, 2011, by means of a written communication, the IACHR advised the parties of the approval of the admissibility report and notified them about the aforementioned joining of petitions. Additionally, in keeping with Article 48.1.f of the Convention, the Commission placed itself at the disposal of the parties to reach a friendly settlement. 6. During the merits stage, the petitioners continued submitting communications separately. Thus, during this stage, additional communications were received in connection with the different petitions on the following dates: i) September 3, 5 and 10, October 3 and 4, November 8, 10, 14 and 24, and December 5, 2011; ii) January 18, April 17, November 5, and December 21, 2012; and iii) April 22, August 12 and September 3, 2013. The State, in turn, made a single submission during the merits stage, on June 21, 2013. In this submission, the State included its reply to the arguments of all the petitions. All of the submissions were duly forwarded to the parties. III. POSITION OF THE PARTIES A. Position of the Petitioners 7. The Commission notes that the substantive allegations of the petitioners pertaining to the violation of Article 8.2.h of the American Convention are similar in content. Accordingly, the IACHR will provide a consolidated description of said arguments. The factual details and the particular domestic proceedings of each petition will be recounted under the Commission’s findings of fact (infra, Proven Facts), based on the information provided by both parties. 8. The petitioners contended that after the various convictions of the alleged victims were handed down, the only remedy available to them was the petition for writ of reversal on cassation (recurso de casación). They argued that said remedy i) only addressed the specific contention of the appellant and did not allow for a comprehensive examination of the judgment; ii) it kept in place the restriction on examining the sequence and account of facts as adjudicated by the sentencing court; and iii) it did not allow for any review of the facts, the evidence, the evaluation of evidence, among other things. 9. They argued that once a conviction is made final – either as a result of the failure to file for a writ of reversal on cassation or because this writ was denied – the only mechanism available is the motion for review of conviction (procedimiento de revisión). They alleged that said procedure is of an extraordinary nature (extraordinario), that is, it is discretionary and therefore is not required to be entertained by a higher court as of right, under Article 42 of the Constitution. They contended that in its rulings on motions for review of conviction (procedimiento de revisión), the Third Chamber for Criminal Matters of the Supreme Court of Justice (hereinafter “the Third Chamber”) has held that “what has been argued cannot be reargued and that the motion for review of conviction was pro-forma.” 4 IACHR, Report No. 105/11, Petitions 663/06, Manfred Amrhein et al, Costa Rica, July 22, 2011, operative items 1 & 2.