23 85. In that case, the Court considered that the institution of impeachment must observe due process in order to ensure the principle of judicial independence with respect to the high ranking magistrales subjected to that procedure 84 . 86. From the above, it is clear that the various international human rights agencies and courts agree that heightened stability in the tenure of judges, and the resultant ban on their free removal, is an essential part of the principle of judicial independence. As the Inter-American Court has said, if a State fails to abide by those guarantees, it would be failing in its obligation of upholding judicial independence. 85 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission has stated that the guarantee of stability in the positions of judges must be reinforced – a requirement that arises from the need to establish mechanisms to ensure their independence from the other branches of government. 86 The Commission highlights the Inter-American Court’s comments on prohibiting the free removal of judges: To the contrary the States could remove the judges and therefore intervene in the Judicial Power without greater costs or control. Additionally, this could generate a fear in the other judges, who observe that their colleagues are dismissed (…). Said fear could also affect judicial independence, since it would promote that the judges follow instructions or abstain from contesting both the nominating and punishing entity. 87 87. To summarize, the principle of judicial independence – together with the associated state obligations of upholding and guaranteeing it – requires that judges have appropriate appointment and promotion procedures, that they are guaranteed stability in their positions during the mandates for which they are appointed, and that they can be removed from office solely for the commission of disciplinary offenses that are previously and clearly set out in the Constitution or domestic law, and in strict compliance with the guarantees of due process. On the basis of those standards, the Commission will first address the regulatory framework applicable to the Supreme Court justices at the time of the facts and will then examine the alleged victims’ removal from their positions in light of Articles 8, 9, and 25 of the American Convention. C. Compatibility of the regulatory framework governing the Supreme Court justices with the American Convention 88. According to the information available in the case file, the Commission has established that on April 7, 1997, a referendum was held in which the questions included one regarding a change in the appointment system for Supreme Court justices, whereby they would be selected from the judiciary – cooptation - and not be subject to term limits. That proposal was answered affirmatively by the Ecuadorian electorate and, consequently, on July 23, 1997, constitutional amendments were enacted including the following addition to Article 129: The members of the Supreme Court of Justice shall not be subject to a limited tenure of office. Their termination shall be on the grounds prescribed by the Constitution and by law. When a vacancy arises, for whatever reason, the plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice shall appoint the new justice by a vote in favor of at least two-thirds of its members, with due consideration to the criteria of professionalism and judicial career as provided for by law. 84 I/A Court H. R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C No. 71, para, 84. 85 I/A Court H. R., Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of June 30, 2009, Series C No. 197, para. 79. See also: Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 86 87 IACHR, Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case 12.556, Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, para. 72. I/A Court H. R., Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of June 30, 2009, Series C No. 197, para. 81.