34 addition, although the President of the Republic’s request was limited to Parliamentary Resolution 25-160, the Constitutional Court restricted the admissibility of amparo filings in challenging parliamentary resolutions in general. 134. So, as narrated in the proven facts, when faced with amparo remedies filed by the former members of the Constitutional Court, the courts were unanimous in stating that under the Constitutional Court’s ruling of December 2, 2004, those filings were inadmissible for challenging the constitutionality of parliamentary resolutions. The Commission therefore believes that the Constitutional Court’s decision of December 2, 2004, was an impediment to the Supreme Court justices’ filing for amparo relief against the resolution whereby their functions were terminated. 135. In second place, the Commission notes that the Constitutional Court’s December 2, 2004 decision was based on an earlier resolution issued by the Supreme Court of Justice on June 27, 2001, in which it clarified a series of criteria relating to constitutional amparo. A reading of that resolution reveals that it cannot be use as grounds for the inadmissibility of amparo remedies for challenging Congress’s termination resolution. Thus, what the Supreme Court of Justice established on June 27, 2001, was that amparo was inadmissible against regulatory provisions and resolutions of a general nature, since unconstitutionality suits were admissible with respect to them. 136. The Commission holds that the resolution whereby the National Congress terminated the justices of the Supreme Court can in no way be considered a resolution of general nature, in that it disposed of the victims’ rights and interests, affecting them in a particular way that could not be challenged by means of an unconstitutionality suit which, by nature, is general and abstract. The Commission therefore believes that the Constitutional Court’s decision of December 2, 2004, was grounded on an contradictory interpretation of the text of the Supreme Court’s resolution of June 27, 2001, which it claimed to use as its basis. 137. Third, even if an unconstitutionality suit could be considered a suitable and effective remedy for challenging the victims’ termination, it would have fallen to the Constitutional Court to rule on any such filing. As indicated in the narrative of the facts, the members of the Constitutional Court at the time the Supreme Court justices were terminated – December 8, 2004 – were appointed by Congress following the termination of the earlier members of the Constitutional Court. The Commission believes that given the way in which the members of that court were appointed, without a legal or constitutional basis, and without clear rules governing their tenure, the Constitutional Court as it stood in December 2004 did not afford adequate guarantees of independence. In addition, it is logical to infer that the Constitutional Court so composed would have a direct interest in the rejection of any action or remedy dealing with the terminations at the Supreme Court of Justice or the Constitutional Court, since a favorable decision would mean that its own appointment was invalid. In such circumstances, neither did any guarantees of impartiality in the resolution of a possible unconstitutionality suit exist. 138. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Commission believes that: (i) the victims were arbitrarily and unreasonably prevented from filing amparo remedies against the National Congress’s termination resolution; and (ii) the Constitutional Court’s indicated remedy – an unconstitutionality suit – was not suitable for challenging the particular effects of that resolution and, in any event, it was an illusory remedy in light of the absence of independence and impartiality on the part of the authority that would have resolved it. 139. Consequently, the Commission concludes that the State of Ecuador failed to provide a simple, prompt, and effective judicial remedy and therefore did violate the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25.1 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the guarantees of independence and impartiality established in Article 8.1 and the obligations set out in Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof, with respect to Hugo Quintana Coello, Alfredo Contreras Villavicencio, Teodoro