55. Thus, the imperatives of duty of each rational being, of one with all others. Each rational being exists as an end in themselves, and never as means for others. Underlying the Kantian reasoning is the principle of the dignity inherent to each human being, which is currently present throughout the corpus juris of International Human Rights Law.33 His main concern is with regard to the protection of human dignity, in any and all situations. 56. From this we can extract some illations. First of all, the Kantian imperative is always present, when dealing with the defense and preservation of the dignity of human beings, the dignity of their own humanity. Second, it affects all spheres of human relations, both in relations of the person with agents of the public or state power, as with other human beings, with individuals.34 Third, it can be invoked in the protection of each human being individually, as well as of groups of people threatened or injured. And, fourth, it can be invoked in the safeguarding of different human rights to be protected. 57. In the Kantian conception, the behavior (moral) of human beings is guided by reason, and not by self-interest or the search for personal advantages. Its hypothetical imperative leads us to reach a specific goal without referring to an intrinsic value, while its categorical imperative orients us to choose a course of action, pursuant to the intrinsic value of the goal to be reached.35 It is precisely here that their actions must aspire to configure at the same time a universal law (supra). Based on their humanity, every person is an end in themselves, never a means, and this is how it must be seen by others. The Kantian imperative has a deep humanistic sense. 58. E. Kant is very clear when he warns that human beings "existe comme fin en soi, et non pas simplement comme moyen dont telle ou telle volonté puisse user à son gré; dans toutes ses actions, aussi bien dans celles qui le concernent lui-même que dans celles qui concernent d'autres êtres raisonnables, il doit toujours être considéré en même temps comme fin."36 His imperative, - as stated by himself, - extends to all beings endowed with reason, to all humanity, which must be considered as an end in itself.37 For Kant, "faire preuve [reprint], pp. 17, 183, and 209. . For a study of said principle with regard to the European Convention of Human Rights, cf. B. Maurer, Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, Paris, Éd. CERIC/Univ. d'Aix-Marseille, 1999, pp. 7-491. 33 . Cf., in this sense, A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford/Florence, Academy of European Law (European University Institute)/Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 545-546. 34 . E. Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs (1785), Paris, Libr. Delagrave, 1999, pp. 15, 43, and 47. 35 . 36 Ibid., p. 148, and cf. p. 150. . Ibid., p. 153. According to Kant, "quand quelqu'un déshonore l'humanité d'un autre homme, c'est comme s'il enlevait toute valeur à la sienne propre, et c'est comme s'il la dégradait"; E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique (1775-1780), Paris, Livr. de Poche/Classiques de Philosophie, 1997, p. 335. 37