"As of this day and forever the people (...) will have the concern to maintain intact the regulations adopted in this Tribunal (...). (...) Reverence and fear (...) will avoid that citizens commit crimes, except if they prefer to annihilate the laws for their well-being (...). No oppression, no anarchy: this is the motto that citizens must follow and respect.19 (...) I hope it is not your intention to exacerbate rage in the heart of the citizens and in them create the thirst of homicides which insanely throws brothers against brothers until leading them to reciprocal extermination (...)."20 39. Currently, the same task of conviction and persuasion are reserved to the courts, to all courts, national and international. Besides the grounds for their judgments, they must make the parties see that the decision reached is pursuant to the applicable law. They may not, in my understanding, leave the doubts presented to them by the parties without clarification, at any time during the processing of the case, even in the form of requests, as in the present case of the Castro Castro Prison, of Interpretation of a Judgment. 40. Reason and persuasion of what is fair, the perennial leason of The Eumenides, is what they must expose, in benefit of the parties. These are not mere elements of the “operation of justice” (to use a “modern” or “post-modern” expression), but instead subjects of the law. Both parties – the plaintiffs and the defendant – have the right to wait for reason and persuasion of what is fair. This right has given way to a human aspiration that has been transmitted from generation to generation, throughout centuries. 41. Currently said right has been invoked in relation to the tasks of contemporary international courts. Actually, the judgment of a tribunal, - as has been stated by J.G. Merrills, - must give “cumulative reasons” that substantiate its conclusion, so that it has persuasion; this applies with even more strength in an international human rights court, whose applicable law is oriented not so much by rules, but by general principles of law.21 This is the only way in which law can be applied and at the same time developed, to obtain results in the search for the full realization of justice, which corresponds in my own point of view to the exercise of the international judicial function. 42. Studies from the past contrasted the "judicial restraint" with the "judicial legislation",22 when referring to the distance between the orthodox vision and the . Versos 904-907, 918-922, and 925-926. . Versos 1138-1143. 19 20 . J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, 2a. ed., Manchester, University Press, 1993, pp. 31, 34-35, 177, 205, and 208-210, and cf. pp. 231-234 and 249-252. 21 . Cf., v.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, London, Stevens, 1958, pp. 75-223. 22