Therefore, the individual’s responsibility, acting individually or in groups, can be considered a violation of International Humanitarian Law. 92. The latter prohibits any act of terrorism. We must recall, in this sense, that the IV Convention of Geneva of 1949 on the Protection of Civilians expressly prohibits inter alia any act of intimidation or terrorism (Article 33). This stipulation was the grounds for the subsequent absolute prohibition, enshrined in the II Additional Protocol of 1977 to the four Conventions of Geneva of 1949, of “acts of terrorism" (Article 4(2)(d)). With regard to the protection of the civil population, the II Additional Protocol prohibits any acts or threats of violence with the purpose of spreading terror among the civil population (Article 13(2)). This same prohibition is also enshrined in the I Additional Protocol (Article 51(2)). The reference to “acts or threats of violence” makes the prohibition especially ample, so that it covers “all possible circumstances."61 93. The acknowledgment that the violations to International Humanitarian Law applicable to armed conflicts (international or domestic) constitute individual criminal responsibility has been considered a “historical event."62 This occurs with even more severity when dealing with grave violations of International Humanitarian Law63 (Articles 50/51/130/147 of the I-IV Conventions of Geneva of 1949, besides Article 85 of the I Additional Protocol of 1977), in relation to which the States Parties to the four Conventions of Geneva of 1949 are compelled to make sure that their legislation includes the “adequate criminal punishments” to be applied, to those responsible, by domestic courts themselves (Articles 49/50/129/146 of the I-IV Conventions of Geneva of 1949).64 94. In practice, several States have already adapted their national legislations to the requirements of the four Conventions of Geneva of 1949; said practice has expanded as of the nineties with the creation of the ad hoc Criminal Courts for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.65 Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in recent years the attention has been focused – in theory and practice – on the . Y. Sandoz, Chr. Swinarski y B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 08 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC/Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 1375 and 1453. 61 . F. Kalshoven y L. Zegveld, Restricciones en la Conducción de la Guerra, 2a. ed., Ginebra, CICR, 2005, p. 220. 62 . Cf. Th. Graditzky, "Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts", 38 International Review of the Red Cross (1998) n. 322, pp. 29-56; and cf. also, regarding those violations, G. Doucet, "La qualification des infractions graves au Droit international humanitaire", in Implementation of International Humanitarian Law / Mise-en-oeuvre du Droit international humanitaire (eds. F. Kalshoven and Y. Sandoz et alii), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 79-107, and cf., in general, E. Méndez, "La Responsabilidad Internacional del Estado y del Individuo por Incumplimiento del Derecho Internacional Humanitario", in [Several Authors,] Derecho Internacional Humanitario (coord. Fabián Novak), Lima, IDEI/Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2003, pp. 463-487. 63 . F. Kalshoven y L. Zegveld, Restricciones en la Conducción de la Guerra, op. cit. supra n. (48), p. 94. 64 . 65 Ibid., pp. 95 and 231.