which I have always defended within this Tribunal, - of the holding of public hearings before the Court. These are essential for the better investigation of the proceedings; in the exercise of the judicial function, the search for truth and the realization of justice should, in my opinion, always prevail over the current eagerness for “productivity” of the majority of the Court. 28. Therefore, I reiterate my firm disagreement with regard to the criterion of the majority of the Court (para. 10 of the present Judgment), for not having considered it necessary to hold a public hearing to issue the present Judgment of Interpretation, due to lack of, in their opinion, “juridical doubt” to be resolved. What currently seems to motivate the majority of the Court is “productivity”, a bad habit inherited from domestic courts, who, at the end of each judicial year, proudly present productivity graphs showing growing numbers of cases “solved” by them (or better said, simply "dealt with"). 29. In my understanding, public hearings are held not only to solve “juridical doubts”, a flagrantly utilitarianistic point of view of the judicial function. Public hearings are held to give the parties the opportunity to reveal to the Court their points of view, their version, or perception of the facts, their arguments with regard to the law (even when there are no “juridical doubts” in the mind of the judges). Within this Court, in certain cases I have given the greatest importance (even with some resistance from the majority) to the psychological, anthropological, and sociological expert assessments, which have contributed to enrich so many Judgments of this Court in cases of specific complexity, of a dense cultural content (such as the cases of Bámaca Velásquez versus Guatemala (2000-2002), of the Moiwana Community versus Suriname (2002), among so many others). It is for me incomprehensible that this Court, deciding against the clock, did not consider indispensable the holding of at least one public hearing in a case of such historical importance as was that of Goiburú et al. versus Paraguay (regarding the sinister “Condor Operation), which could have enriched its Judgment in many aspects. 30. An international tribunal such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights not only “solves” doubts and cases, but also states which is the Law, it makes Justice, and restores the dignity of victims. In order to state which is the Law, we must benefit from other branches of human knowledge, since, to the contrary of what was arrogantly thought by the positivists, Law is not self-sufficient and lawyers have a lot to learn from other areas of human knowledge. In order to make Justice, the parties must be given a chance to present all their arguments. And to restore the dignity of the victims, we must let them express themselves freely, we must hear them attentively, even as a form of reparation. 31. The victims of bad treatments and torture (v.g., cases of Loayza Tamayo versus Peru, 1997-1998; Suárez Rosero versus Ecuador, 1997-1999; Cantoral Benavides versus Peru, 2000-2001; Tibi versus Ecuador, 2004; among others), who have been strongly humiliated, for the first time feel legally equal to the respondent States, upon personally presenting their case before the Court and personally vindicating before it the reparation. The victims act as real subject of law and not as mere objects of protection. This also contributes to avoiding the repetition of the violations. The jurisprudence itself must reflect the interdisciplinary nature (Law, psychology, anthropology, sociology) in attention to and in the reparations ordered in favor of victims. 32. During the years of my Presidency of the Inter-American Court, I invariably made emphasis in receiving, in public hearings, not only witnesses, but also experts from different areas of human knowledge. I have always given said public hearings a greater relevance, based on a series of reasons: a) they contribute to the materialization of the equality of arms (égalité des armes), so the parties have equal