127. The reason behind this guarantee is that a judgment which “has enforceable authority gives rise to certainty as to the right or dispute under discussion in the particular case, and therefore its binding force is one of the effects thereof.”186 Furthermore, the Court has affirmed that execution of judgments is an integral part of the right of access to judicial recourse, and it must also encompass full enforcement of the respective decision; because the “contrary would imply the denial of this right.”187 128. The Commission has further established that the obligation of the State to ensure enforcement of judicial rulings is particularly important when the party who must carry out the judgment is an organ of the State, taking into account the unequal relationship of power and resources between the parties.188 129. Therefore, it can be stated that the right to judicial protection would be illusory if the domestic law of the State allowed a final and binding decision to remain ineffective to the detriment of the injured party.189 The fundamental premise of the administration of justice is the binding nature of decisions made by the judiciary on the rights and obligations of citizens, which must be executed.190 130. In the instant case, the petitioner puts forth two major arguments regarding execution and enforcement of the judgment award the State was ordered to pay to Sebastian. The first of these arguments pertains to the State allegedly delaying execution of judgment, that is, the award was not actually paid until more than 2 years after said judgment was rendered. In response, the State contends that no unwarranted delay can be ascribed to it. On this issue, the Commission finds that said arguments have already been examined in the reasonable time analysis above. 131. The second argument, consisting of three aspects, is related to the damages awarded by the domestic court. The first aspect pertains to questioning the amount that was awarded as damages; the second one has to do with the fact that the judgment ordered the State to pay in pesos and, in the end, it was paid in bonds; and the third aspect is related to the difference between the amount awarded in the judgment and the amount actually received by the petitioner. The State counters that all three aspects of the petitioner’s second argument fall outside of the scope of jurisdiction of the IACHR. 132. Regarding the petitioner’s argument of inadequacy of the amount awarded by the domestic courts as compensation for damages in the case of his son, the Commission finds that –as was established in its admissibility report191- it is not up to the bodies of the system in this specific case to examine this particular issue of the amount awarded by the sentence. 186 I/A Court H.R., Case of Acevedo Buendía et al (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’s Office”). Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009. Series C No. 198, para. 72, I/A Court H.R., Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al v. Peru. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 167. 187 I/A Court H.R., Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al v. Peru. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 220; I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena Ricardo et al v. Panama. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 82. 188 Arguments of the IACHR at the I/A Court H.R., Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al v. Peru. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 205. Also see IACHR, Report N° 110/00, Case 11.800, César Cabrejos Bernuy, Peru, December 4, 2000, paras. 31 and 33. 189 I/A Court H.R., Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 219. 190 See Application of the IACHR in the case of Mejía Idrovo vs. Ecuador, brought before the Inter-American Court on November 19, 2009. 191 In its Admissibility Report, the IACHR held that: “[t]he Commission observes in this regard that a disagreement as to the quantity of compensation awarded by national courts acting in accordance with due process and within the sphere of their competence would not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient basis for an exercise of jurisdiction at the international level. The quantity of compensation awarded would, in principle, normally be a question for the judiciary of the state concerned.”