64 and not in function of the circumstances of a very limited group of pensioners, who do not necessarily represent the prevailing situation. 148. It is evident that this is what is occurring in the instant case; therefore, the Court considers that it is in order to reject the request to rule on the progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights in Peru, in the context of this case. X ARTICLE 8 (RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL) Arguments of the representatives of the alleged victims and their next of kin 149. In the brief on requests, arguments and evidence the representatives of the alleged victims and their next of kin alleged that the State had violated Article 8(1) of the Convention; this was not included in the application filed by the InterAmerican Commission. In that respect, they alleged: a) In view of the violation of their rights, the five pensioners filed applications for amparo before the sitting civil judges, who were the only ones competent to hear this type of action, according to the provisions of the Habeas Corpus and Amparo Act. These judges heard the complaints that had been filed and delivered the respective judgments. However, on April 23, 1994, Legislative Decree No. 817, “The State social security regime Act,” was promulgated. It established that, as of that date, all legal proceedings concerning the pension regime of State’s civil servants governed by Decree Law No. 20530 – including those already underway – would be decided exclusively by the Transitory Corporative Public Law Courts; b) The promulgation of Legislative Decree No. 817 deprived the judges who had been hearing the proceedings on execution of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru in relation to the harm suffered by the five pensioners of competence, and these cases were transferred to the two Transitory Corporative Public Law Courts in Lima. Both courts were “presided by interim judges [...and] the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights itself had at one time indicated that they were officials who had been called into question owing to their anti-juridical decisions”; c) The State could not assign cases on the pension regime of State civil servants to be heard by interim judges. “By changing the jurisdiction to this type of judge, who could be controlled by the Executive (and, therefore, lacking the independence demanded by Article 8(1) of the Convention), it sought to ensure decisions which would discourage filing applications for amparo that would be decided favorably for the pensioners, as had occurred in some cases. The interim public law judges [...] changed jurisprudence and affirmed that compliance proceedings were not the appropriate mechanism for obtaining payment of sums of money, because the decisions taken in that type of proceeding had declarative rather than condemnatory effects, and execution had to be implemented by another mechanism.” These decisions of the interim judges disregarded the nature of compliance proceedings as simple and prompt recourses to protect the individual in the face of violations of fundamental rights and, thereby, prejudiced the five pensioners;