31 143. The Court deems it useful to examine the arguments of the parties regarding the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention as follows. It will verify: (a) whether the State respected the victims’ right to the presumption of innocence; (b) whether they were granted adequate time and means to prepare their defense; (c) whether their right to be assisted by legal counsel was respected; (d) whether the criminal proceedings took a reasonable time, and (e) whether Mr. Chaparro’s right to information about consular assistance was respected. To this end, the Court will take into account that the State presented its complete acquiescence in the case of Article 8 of the Convention. A) RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 144. The Commission alleged that the State violated the victims’ right to presumption of innocence for the duration of their preventive detention and because Article 116 of the NDPSA was applied to the case “which presumed the grave guilt of the accused,” even though the Constitutional Court of Ecuador declared this norm unconstitutional only days after the victims’ arrest. The representatives endorsed this argument. 145. This Court has indicated that the principle of presumption of innocence constitutes a cornerstone of the right to a fair trial. The provisions of Article 8(2) of the Convention establish the obligation of the State not to restrict the liberty of a detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not prevent the proceedings from being conducted or evade the justice system. Hence, preventive detention is a precautionary rather than a punitive measure. 146. The Court has stated that there would be a violation of the Convention if individuals whose criminal responsibility has not been established are deprived of their liberty for a disproportionate length of time, because this would be tantamount to anticipating a sentence, which is at odds with universally recognized general principles of law. 88 147. In the previous chapter, the Court declared that the order to remand the victims in custody was arbitrary because it did not contain reasoned and objective legal grounds regarding its merits. The Court considered that the recourses filed by the victims to achieve their release were ineffective, and indicated that the judge did not set out reasons to justify maintaining the precautionary measure. Bearing this in mind, together with the duration of the deprivation of liberty of the victims (supra para. 141) and the State’s acquiescence, the Court declares that Ecuador violated the right to presumption of innocence of Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo embodied in Article 8(2) of the InterAmerican Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. 148. Regarding Article 116 of the NDPSA, the Court does not find it proved that it was applied in this specific case. d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel; e) the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law; […] 88 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 43, para. 180; Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 72, para. 77, and Case of Acosta Calderón, supra note 47, para. 111.