114. In the instant case, the Commission has considered it proven fact that on August 2, 1994 the Provincial Chief of the Drug Enforcement Police and Interpol of Pichincha, at the behest of the Investigating Official, filed a request with the Chief of Police of Pichincha to execute search warrants of buildings and to issue “the appropriate arrest warrants for anyone involved in these crimes.” However, in response to that request, the Police Chief authorized the searches and explained that “should any persons be arrested, the provisions of Articles 172 and 173 of the code of criminal procedure would be enforced” which, as has been explained above, require that detentions be based on court-issued arrest warrants, except when offenders are caught in flagrante delicto. 115. The Commission notes that after executing the search warrant of the warehouse, owned by Mrs. Alba Tinitana, where the drugs were found, “all of the suspects were indiscriminately arrested.” It was the next day, August 3, 1994, when the Provincial Chief of the Drug Enforcement Police and Interpol of Pichincha reported to the Police Chief the arrest of 12 individuals, including the alleged victim victims, and requested that their arrest be authorized as legal. 116. The Commission notes that when the alleged victims were arrested there were no individually identified arrest warrants issued against them by a judicial authority, as required under article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 117. As for the element of being caught in flagrante delicto, the State has not raised these grounds. Based on a reading of the official records pertaining to the search warrants and the arrests, it is not apparent either that it has raised these grounds. It must be noted that at the time of the arrest the suspects were not in possession of any illegal substance and the drugs that have been identified were located in the warehouse belonging to another person, Mrs. Alba Tinitana. 118. However, the Commission notes that Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “departs from the constitutional standard,” by establishing “additional grounds for an arrest without a warrant from a competent authority,” which is a “serious presumption of responsibility.”98 119. Should these have been the grounds for the arrest, the Commission cites a holding of the Court that the strict requirement for making an exception under the law curtailing the right to personal liberty in keeping with Article 7.2 of the Convention is to issue a statutory description of the criminal offense, as specifically as possible and “establish beforehand” the “reasons” for which, and the “conditions” in which, a person may be physically deprived of their liberty. Consequently, any requirement established under domestic law that is not abided by when an individual is deprived of his or her liberty, renders such a deprivation illegal and a violation of the American Convention. 99 120. As the Commission stated in Merits Report 66/01 Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez,100 the grounds of “serious presumption of responsibility” is not set forth in the Constitution. Moreover, it opens the door to the subjective judgment of the police officer as to what he or she understands as “serious presumption of responsibility” leaving “the definition to the discretion of the police officer making the arrest.” 101 …continuación 97 IA Court of HR. Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para.. 61; and Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 103. 98 IACHR, Merits Report 66/01.Case 11.992 Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez (Ecuador), June 14, 2001. par- 36. 99 IA Court of HR. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 55. 100 IACHR, Merits Report 66/01.Case 11.992 Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez (Ecuador), June 14, 2001. 101 IACHR, Merits Report 66/01.Case 11.992 Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez (Ecuador), June 14, 2001, para. 36. 29