4. Thus, this does not contradict the Inter-American Court’s conclusions because the judgment declares that the State violated the right to life of these three individuals and describes the factual circumstances in which this occurred. In turn, the Court expressed its doubts with regard to the version of the supposed “confrontation” that was referred to by the domestic courts. Consequently, the IACtHR does not rule out that this violation of the right to life occurred as the result of an extrajudicial execution. 5. This is supported by the fact that the Court makes a clear reference to the “context” of extrajudicial executions in Venezuela at the time of the deaths of these three individuals by the State’s law enforcement agents. This reference to the “context” in both the chapter on Facts and the chapter on Merits would make no sense if the InterAmerican Court did not consider that this fact formed part of a situation of extrajudicial executions and, precisely because of this, when analyzed together with all the other indications and presumptions, the IACtHR should have ruled concluding that, in this case, the violation of the right to life was the result of the extrajudicial execution of the three victims. 6. Therefore, in this concurring opinion, we will explain the reasons why we consider that the IACtHR should have concluded that the violation of the right to life of the three members of the Díaz family constituted an “extrajudicial execution” that was inserted in a national (Venezuela) and regional (Aragua state) context that existed at the time of the facts of this case. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the “context” and the geographical region were mentioned in the judgment because these have been the subject of rulings in previous judgments of the Inter-American Court establishing the State’s responsibility.7 7. Accordingly, this opinion contains the following sections: I. The proven context in Venezuela and in Aragua State of extrajudicial executions at the time of the facts of this case (paras. 8-16); II. The judgment’s conclusions on the deaths of the three victims in this case (paras. 17-21); III. The facts of the case constitute “extrajudicial executions” (paras. 22-38); and IV. Conclusion (paras. 39-40). I. THE PROVEN CONTEXT IN VENEZUELA AND IN ARAGUA STATE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 8. The IACtHR noted that, at the time of the events related to the deaths of the three members of the Díaz family, victims in this case, there was a context of extrajudicial executions by police officers in Venezuela and, in particular, in Aragua state, the place where the events of this case occurred. 9. In the judgment, the Inter-American Court noted that the Ombudsman had identified “certain patterns of police conduct,” with the following characteristics: 8 a) The official version of the police generally refers to the death of the victims in an alleged confrontation; of Díaz Loreto et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2019, paras. 80 to 86. Cf. Case of the Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281; Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Merits and reparations. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 249, and Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2011. Series C No. 237. 7 Cf. Case of Díaz Loreto et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2019, para. 66. The IACtHR took into consideration the Ombudsman’s 2003 report, as well as the opinion provided by expert witness Lisandro Raúl Cubas during the public hearing in this case. 8 2