13. That said, the principal rule for the interpretation of treaties contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties25 and 26 is that: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 14. This provision includes four means of interpretation. One of the methods is based on good faith which signifies that what was agreed by the States Parties to the treaty in question should be understood in accordance with what they really intended to agree on, so that this is applied faithfully and has practical effects. The second is the textual or literal method, which relates to the analysis of the text of the treaty, the vocabulary used and the ordinary meaning of its terms. Another is the subjective method, which seeks to establish the intention of the States Parties to the treaty by also analyzing the travaux préparatoires and their impact on the treaty. And the fourth is the functional or teleological method that seeks to determine the object and purpose of the treaty. These four methods should be applied simultaneously and harmoniously in the interpretation of a treaty, without giving preference to any of them. 27 15. Ultimately, what underlines everything indicated above is, on the one hand, that the inter-American jurisdiction established in the Convention is the peaceful way to resolve the disputes that arise among its States Parties in relation to respect for the human rights of the persons subject to their respective jurisdictions and, on the other, that the Court, when proceeding in conformity with the provisions of the Convention, provides its rulings with the necessary corresponding legal certainty. And, all this considering that the law is the means to achieve justice and justice the means to achieve peace. B. The role of the individual opinion 16. This partially dissenting opinion is issued with full and absolute respect for the decisions taken by the Court in this case that, consequently, must be complied with. This text cannot, therefore, be interpreted in any way or under any circumstance as detracting from the legitimacy of the decision adopted in this case. 17. Based on the foregoing consideration, I must, therefore, indicate expressly that the thesis set out in this opinion does not seek, in any way, to weaken or restrict the exercise of 25 Hereinafter, the Vienna Convention. Art. 31: General rule of interpretation. 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 26 Art. 32: “Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” This is what differentiates the interpretation of a treaty from the interpretation of the law in which, in some countries, such as Chile – according to article 19 of its Civil Code – the literal interpretation prevails: “When the meaning of the law is clear, its literal meaning should not be disregarded, on the pretext of consulting its spirit. However, in order to interpret an obscure expression of the law, it is possible to have recourse to its intention or spirit, clearly expressed in the law, or in the authoritative history of its elaboration.” 27 5