and, second, because, rather than the intervention of the inter-American jurisdiction, this is intended to ensure the prompt re-establishment by the State concerned of the human rights violated, so that such intervention would be unnecessary. 85. Ultimately, since the rule of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is essential, substantial, intrinsic or “pivotal” in the inter-American system of human rights, if it is applied in a way other than the one substantiated in this opinion, it could render it senseless which, would doubtless affect the system as a whole. VI. CONCLUSION 86. Based on all the foregoing, it may be concluded that, in order to lodge a petition before the Commission accusing a State Party to the Convention of violating any human right recognized therein, the petitioner must previously have exhausted the domestic remedies and then, in the petition, describe the measures taken to this end or the impossibility of exhausting such remedies. It is also my opinion that, it is with regard to this petition or the relevant parts thereof that the State in question should be notified so that, in its response, it can refute the petitioner’s assertion of having previously exhausted the domestic remedies or the impossibility of doing so, filing the corresponding objection. And, evidently, if the petition does not mention compliance with the requirement of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State is not obliged to take a stand in that regard. 87. It should also be indicated that, if the petition includes information on exhaustion of the domestic remedies or the impossibility of doing so, it is based on the submission of the petition and the response of the State that the relevant litigation is founded and, consequently, it is regarding whether at that time – and not subsequently – such remedies have been exhausted or that it was not compulsory to do so, that the Commission should rule in its admissibility report. 88. In addition, the instant case reveals that the facts relating to the requirement of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, are: a) The petition lodged with the Commission on March 14, 2007, cites the exception established in Article 46(2)(c)) of the Convention – namely, the unjustified delay in deciding the criminal proceedings in reference – as grounds for non-application of the provisions of paragraph (1)(a) of this article; that is, the requirement of previous exhaustion of domestic remedies. In this regard, it indicates that, at that date, three years and eight months had elapsed since the events occurred and three years since the prosecutor filed an indictment and none of the perpetrators had been tried or punished. b) The State, in its response to the forwarding of the petition dated January 26, 2008, filed the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies at that date indicating, in this regard, that the case that originated the petition had initiated on January 3, 2003; that on January 18, 2006, the corresponding trial had begun; that on April 25, 2007, an acquittal had been delivered; that on July 19, 2007, the Public Prosecution Service had filed an appeal; that the corresponding hearing was set for October 4, 2007, and that this was then postponed until February 14, 2008, and c) On July 24, 2008, in its Admissibility Report, the Commission ruled rejecting the objection filed by the State on the basis that, at that time, the petition was admissible and, consequently, not considering the date the petition was lodged or that, when making this ruling, the respective domestic proceedings were pending an appeal. 19