VIII-3 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO ADOPT DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 126. The Commission considered that the wording of the disciplinary grounds applied to the presumed victim was excessively broad, so that it affected the predictability of the conducts that, pursuant to the law, could be censured and gave the disciplinary authorities “an extremely broad margin of discretion” for applying the law. Specifically, the Commission argued that the prohibition of “attacking, in any way,” the conduct of judges and justices stipulated in article 323.4 of the Organic Code of the Courts was, in itself, incompatible with the principle of legality, because it was excessively broad. This latitude “prevent[ed] the presumed victim from having certainty about what was required by the law, because it was not reasonable to infer that a critical analysis of the position of the Chilean Judiciary during the military regime could be classified as an attack on one’s superiors.” This “exceeded the predictability of the law so that, reasonably, Judge Urrutia could know that the notion of ‘attack’ included writing an academic paper for a course, which was neither published nor criticized specific justices or judges.” 127. The representatives argued that “for the Chilean courts, the grounds to sanction Judge Urrutia Laubreaux were […] so broad and ambiguous […] that, by a discretional interpretation, they culminated in engaging the consequent international responsibility of the Chilean State. Thus, these grounds not only gave rise to uncertainty, […] but also involved the lack of predictability of sanctioned conducts, contrary to the principle of legality.” They also argued that, the principle of legality had also been violated because the Supreme Court had heard the appeal filed by Judge Urrutia when “it was this court itself, that, in first instance, had forwarded the academic paper to the court of La Serena so that it would sanction him.” 128. The State argued that “the reasoning of the decisions of both the Appellate Court of La Serena and the Supreme Court is clear in indicating that the disciplinary measure was applied as a reprimand for the criticism contained in the [presumed victim’s] paper regarding the actions of the highest courts of justice, specifically the Supreme Court, and of that court’s moral failure in relation to human rights violations, and this corresponds to the offense defined in article 323 of the OCC.” Regarding the precision of the norm applied, the State argued that “the principle of legality is not incompatible with the existence of a certain degree of indetermination.” It indicated that the “rule contained in article 323.4 of the OCC is clear: judicial officials are prohibited from attacking, in any way, the official conduct of other judges or justices. Even though this prohibition may be considered broad, it can never be considered imprecise or vague.” Regarding the predictability of the sanction, Chile argued that “article 323.4 of the OCC […] establishes a duty of conduct that is sufficiently predictable to allow those concerned to understand the consequences of non-compliance with it.” It argued that “the application of a sanction to Judge Urrutia in 2005 for failure to comply with the judicial obligations indicated in article 323.4 of the OCC represents an exception in Chilean disciplinary case law. Since then, no higher court of justice has used this article to issue a disciplinary sanction against a judge.” Considerations of the Court 129. With regard to the principle of legality, the Court has indicated that it is also in force in relation to disciplinary matters; however, its scope depends to a considerable extent on the matter regulated. The precision of a sanctioning rule of a disciplinary nature may be different 33