regulation should reveal in violation of the principle of legality contained in Article 9 of the Convention. The State itself implicitly recognized this argument when it indicated that these disciplinary grounds were used for the last time against Mr. Urrutia, which “was an exception in Chilean disciplinary case law,” and that they had not been applied in the course of the last 14 years, thus admitting that they violated the Convention. 136. Furthermore, the Court notes that regulations such as this violate not only the principle of legality but also judicial independence. Indeed, irrespective of the lack of precision in the legal formulation of the said regulation, this Court finds it necessary to note that the guarantee for everyone that they will be tried by an “independent” judge in Article 8(1) of the Convention, presupposes the existence of “independent” judges; in other words, that every State must respect judicial independence. 137. Although it is evident that there are limitations inherent in the judicial function in relation to public statements, especially with regard to the cases submitted to the jurisdictional decisions of judges, these should not be confused with statements that criticize other judges and, especially, statements made in public defense of their own functional performance. 138. Prohibiting judges from criticizing the functioning of the power of the State of which they form part, which necessarily involves the criticism of the conduct of other judges, or requiring that they request authorization from the President of the highest court to do this and, moreover, that they must act in the same way when they wish to defend their own judicial actions, signifies opting for a hierarchized model of the Judiciary in the form of a corporation in which judges lack internal independence, with a propensity towards unconditional subordination to the authority of their own collegiate organs and although, formally, the intention may be to limit this to the disciplinary sphere, in practice, owing to inherent fear of this power, it results in subjugation to so-called “superior” jurisprudence and paralyzes the interpretive dynamic in the application of the law. 139. Furthermore, the Court recalls that Article 2 of the Convention obliges States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.130 This obligation involves the adoption of two types of measures: on the one hand, the elimination of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention, 131 either because they reject those rights and freedoms or because they prevent their exercise;132 and, on the other, the issue of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees. 133 140. The violations of the Convention determined in this chapter resulted from the application of article 323.4 of the Organic Code of the Courts. The Court notes that based on Article 2 of the Convention, the State was obliged to eliminate norms that entailed a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention. Therefore, the State incurred in an omission by keeping this norm in force. This omission resulted in a violation of Article 2 of the Convention Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Surinam. Preliminary objections. Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 12, para. 50, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 96. 130 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 96. 131 Cf. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 113, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 96. 132 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 207, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 96. 133 35