4 20. As far as my opinion goes, I will point out that in my separate opinion on the judgment rendered in the Case of López-Alvarez v Honduras, of February 1, 2006 – which I addressed in my opinion in the Case of Valle-Jaramillo – I tried to characterize the nature and scope of the elements of the reasonable time period as taken from the European case law, and noted the convenience of “expand[ing] the analysis of the reasonable time and examin[ing] the possibility of incorporating other elements that merited analysis into this concept – in order to assess respect for or failure to respect due process.” 21. I maintained as follows: “It seems possible that the complexity of the matter that motivates the process, the behavior of the interested party – in this case, the defendant – and the acts of the authority may not be enough to provide a convincing conclusion of the undue delay, that violates or puts the judicial rights of the subject in grave danger. Thus the appropriateness, in my opinion, of exploring other elements that complement, but do not substitute them, for the determination of a fact - the violation of the reasonable time - for which there are no quantitative universally-applicable boundaries.” 22. Then I mentioned “a possible fourth element to be considered in estimating reasonable time,” what I called the ‘actual impairment of an individual’s rights and obligations caused by the proceedings – that is, his judicial situation.’ “It is possible that the latter could have little relevance on this situation; if this is not so, that is, if the relevance increases, until it is intense, it would be necessary, for the sake of justice and security, both seriously threatened, that the process be more diligent so that the subject’s situation, which has begun to seriously affect his life, may be decided in a short time – ‘reasonable time’. The impairment must be real, not simply possible or probable, eventual or remote.” 23. “At times, when weighing harm, the time elapsed is irrelevant; in others, it is very detrimental to the victim. Consequently, the other elements used to assess reasonableness – complexity of the matter and conduct of authorities and private individuals – should also be examined in light of the prejudice that is being caused to the victim. Time does not elapse equally for everyone, and the elements usually taken into consideration to establish the reasonableness of time do not affect everyone in the same way (…)” I again addressed this subject in my opinions on the judgments rendered in the cases of Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay, of March 28, 2006, and Ituango Massacres v Colombia, of July 1, 2006. 24. Then, just like I am doing here, I stressed that: “it is not my purpose to replace the elements of traditional legal doctrine and concentrate all the consequences of measuring reasonable time on the harm caused; on no account. Nor have I suggested that a lack of appreciable harm legitimates the passage of time, whatsoever the length, and absolves the State of responsibility as regards due process; on no account. I am merely suggesting the pertinence of looking at the traditional elements of measurement also – and only, also – from the optic or the perspective of the actual harm that the passage of time causes to the victim. This constitutes an additional factor in the assessment, which should be combined with the other factors considered to measure the reasonableness of the elapsed time. Sergio García-Ramírez Judge Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri Secretary