18 extension granted by the Court with the warning that the new time limit was nonextendible. The admission of said brief would violate “equality of arms and place the other parties to the proceedings in a situation of defenselessness” while “the principle of legal certainty would be seriously impaired in the present case.” 49. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, given that the delay was minor and that, apart from the representatives’ general assertions, it has not been proven that the admission of these observations would entail a procedural imbalance that would prejudice the parties or affect legal certainty, the Court admits the State’s brief. For the same reasons, the Court admits the opinion of expert witness Andreu Guzmán, forwarded by the Inter-American Commission three days after the time limit had expired, because the expert witness “had an insuperable technical problem.” 50. In relation to the statements of the alleged victims, the State affirmed, in general terms, that in the statements of Mrs. Fernández Ortega, of the girl Noemí Prisciliano Fernández, and Mr. Prisciliano Sierra, “[i]t is very evident that these three people were tutored when they gave their corresponding ‘testimony,’ because they coincide in trying to correct the errors [and contradictions] in which they incurred years before when making their respective statements before the Public Prosecutor’s Office.” Furthermore, Mexico questioned specific assertions in their testimony before this Court, when “they could have made them before the civil or village authorities many years ago.” Lastly, as an example of the rectification of supposed contradictions, the State mentioned the coincidence among the statements made in these proceedings with regard to the number of soldiers who were allegedly involved, contrary to what was indicated in their statements before the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 51. In particular, in relation to the statement of Noemí Prisciliano Fernández, the State affirmed that “it should be summarily rejected, because its content does not correspond to events she witnessed; in other words, most of her testimony is based on things her mother told her, which she then testified before the [n]otary as being her personal experience.” Furthermore, it asked the Court to set aside the part of the testimony “which refers to the threats that supposedly she and members of her family have suffered” because this “is not the purpose of the [litis] of this case, but rather of the provisional measures.” 52. With regard to Mr. Prisciliano Sierra’s statement, the State indicated that “he was not present during the events that allegedly took place on March 22, 2002,” therefore, his testimony should be considered “merely hearsay.” In addition, because they were not related to the purpose of the litis of this contentious case, the State asked the Court to reject the statements concerning: i) “the alleged threats against [him] made by [two individuals],” which are the purpose of the provisional measures only, and ii) “the alleged visits, in January 2003, that a group of [soldiers] made to [him].” Furthermore, it asked the Court not to admit the statement about the April 5, 2002, procedure conducted by the Civil Public Prosecutor’s Office, “because it does not correspond to the truth of the facts,” given that “there is no mention whatsoever of [his] presence and participation in this procedure.” 53. In keeping with the jurisprudence of the Court, the statements made by the alleged victims cannot be assessed alone, but rather together with all the evidence in the proceedings;41 they are useful because they can provide more information on the alleged violations and their consequences. The Court observes that the 41 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs, supra note 21, para. 70; Case of Chitay Nech et al, supra note 18, para. 56, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas , supra note 18, para. 65.