its origin or emergence. The former conditions are procedural in nature, while the establishment of the responsibility of the State is in the sphere of substantive or material law. I do not see how one can relate said establishment with the “principle of subsidiarity,” as it is called, which refers directly and specifically to the protection mechanisms, at the national and international levels –the international ones being considered “subsidiary” to the national ones. 24. The subsidiarity mentioned above does not encompass material law, that is, it cannot be invoked with respect to the substantive provisions pertaining to the protected rights, nor regarding the content and scope of the respective obligations. In my opinion, one cannot give said subsidiarity a dimension that it does not effectively have, and never did. Furthermore, viewing relations between the international and national legal systems from the standpoint of the “principle of subsidiarity” is essentially static. Therefore, it does not faithfully reflect the dynamics and current state of evolution of the interaction between international law and the domestic law of the States in the current sphere of protection, for the benefit of the human beings protected. 25. As I mentioned, in this regard, in my Concurring Opinion in the case of "The Last Temptation of Christ" (2001), international law will be perfected and strengthened when human conscience attains a degree of evolution such that it no longer accepts the enactment of domestic laws (or administrative acts or court decisions) that obstruct application of international provisions for protection integrated with the provisions of domestic law (para. 10). And, long before my aforementioned Opinion, in an essay published in Germany in 1977-1978, I argued that, since human rights treaties entrust the national courts themselves with protective functions in the application of the rule of domestic remedies, said remedies are part of the international protection procedures; the purpose and effect of the resulting interaction between the international and national legal systems in the current context of protection is to perfect the national legal protection systems, as required by international instruments to safeguard human rights.24 III. Emancipation of the Individual vis-à-vis his or her own State. 26. This is not the first time that this happens. Previously, in the case of the “Five Pensioners” versus Peru (2003), the petitioners and the Commission also followed different lines of reasoning with respect to a certain aspect of their respective pleadings. This is natural, and heartening, as it helps to highlight the different roles of the petitioners (the true substantive applicant party before the Court) and the Commission (as the auxiliary body of the Court in adjudicatory proceedings under the American Convention, and the defender of public interest and guardian of the Convention). 27. In my Concurring Opinion in that case of the “Five Pensioners” (para. 16), I pointed out that this development reflects the necessary prevalence of the entitlement of individuals to all the rights protected by the Convention above all other considerations, as subjects of International Human Rights Law. Said development is also a direct consequence of the step forward taken by the Court since it adopted its current rules of Procedure, the fourth in its history, granting locus standi in judicio to the individual petitioners in all stages of the procedure 24 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Exhaustion of Remedies in International Law and the Role of National Courts", 17 Archiv des Volkerrechts - Tübingen (1977-1978) pp. 333-370; and see, in this same regard, twenty years later, A.A. Cançado Trindade, O Esgotamento dos Recursos Internos no Direito Internacional, 2d. updated ed., Brasilia, Edit. Universidad de Brasilia, 1997, pp. 176-177 and 244-245.