before the Court. As I argued in my aforementioned Opinion in the case of the “Five Pensioners” (para. 19), and as was corroborated in the adjudicatory proceeding before this Court in the instant case of the Gómez Paquiyauri brothers, “The petitioners themselves are those who, better than anyone else, can assess which rights have presumably been violated. To attempt to restrict this faculty would go against the right of access to justice under the American Convention.” 28. Furthermore, as I have been arguing in recent years, we are in the midst of a historical process of strengthening of the emancipation of the individual vis-à-vis his or her own State. Six years ago, in my Concurring Opinion in the Castillo Petruzzi et al. versus Peru case (Preliminary Objections, 1998) before this Court, I summarized as follows the “qualitative leap” that would take place under the American Convention: “This means to seek to secure, not only the direct representation of the victims or their relatives (locus standi) in the procedure before the Inter-American Court in cases already forwarded to it by the Commission (in all stages of the proceedings and not only in that of reparations25),but rather the right of direct access of individuals before the Court itself (jus standi), so as to bring a case directly before it, as the sole future jurisdictional organ for the settlement of concrete cases under the American Convention. To that end, individuals would do without the Inter-American Commission, which would, nevertheless, retain functions other than the contentious one,26 prerogative of the future permanent Inter-American Court.27 (...)Above all, this qualitative advance would fulfill, in my understanding, an imperative of justice. The jus standi - no longer only locus standi in judicio, - without restrictions, of individuals, before the Inter-American Court itself, represents - as I have indicated in my Opinions in other cases before the Court28 - the logical consequence of the conception and formulation of rights to be protected under the American Convention at the international level, to which the full juridical capacity of the individual petitioners to vindicate them ought to correspond necessarily.” (paras. 42-43) 29. More recently, in my Concurring Opinion in the aforementioned case of the “Five Pensioners” (2003), I argued that “Not always the complaint originally presented by the petitioners before the Commission (Article 44 of the Convention) is necessarily the same as the complaint subsequently interposed by the Commission before the Court (Article 61(1) of the Convention). If the States are required, in conformity with the Convention (Article 25), to respect the right of access to justice, preserving the faculty of the individual complainants to substantiate their legal actions before national tribunals, how can they be denied this same faculty in their arguments before an international tribunal like the InterAmerican Court? (...) one cannot curtail the right of the petitioners of access to justice at the international level, expressed in their faculty to indicate the rights which they deem violated.” (paras. 20-21) The same applies to the arguments of the applicants on birth or emergence of international responsibility of the respondent State. IV. Implementation of the International Responsibility of the State through the Initiative of the Individual as a Subject of International Law. 25 . As occurred under the previous (third) Rules of Procedure of the Court, Article 23. 26 . Like those of the undertaking of missions of in loco observation and the preparation of reports. 27 . resources. 28 Enlarged, functioning in chambers, and with considerably greater human and material . See, in this regard, my Separate Opinions in the Castillo Páez versus Peru case (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 30.01.1996), paras. 14-17, and Loayza Tamayo versus Peru case (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 31.01.1996), paras. 14-17, respectively.