-6possibility of the Inter-American Commission formulating recommendations on the status of the ESCR in its annual report. observations and 19. Despite the fact that that Article 19(6) of the Protocol establishes the limitation of competence clearly and precisely, some authors have indicated that evolutive interpretation and the pro homine principle should be used in order to update the normative meaning and scope of Article 26 of the Convention. Consequently, I will now examine some of the arguments employed to justify this position. D. Evolutive interpretation and pro homine principle 20. On this point, those who propose the direct justiciability of ESCR by the application of Article 26 of the Convention have argued that one of the ways to overcome the barrier to competence that the Protocol stipulates would be by applying an evolutive interpretation. In particular, they use comparative law as a tool, because several constitutional courts of the countries of the region have accepted the direct justiciability of ESCR. However, I consider that this issue should be tackled in two ways. The first entails an examination of the other interpretive methods under international law, because the evolutive method is not the only one that should be taken into account. Second, I will present my opinion on how the comparative law on this issue should be assessed. 21. Regarding the means of interpretation that should be taken into account, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establish the most important methods. The Inter-American Court has reflected this in its case law; thus, in addition to the evolutive method, it has used other interpretation criteria, such as literal interpretation, systematic interpretation, and teleological interpretation. In this regard, the Court has understood that literal interpretation is the interpretation made in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms used. The Court has used this type of interpretation when considering the literal meaning of some expressions and terms of the Convention and other treaties. 17 Meanwhile, based on a systematic interpretation, the Court has maintained that the norms must be interpreted as part of a whole, the meaning and scope of which should be established in function of the legal system to which it belongs.18 In the context of this type of interpretation, the Court has analyzed the travaux préparatoires of the American Declaration and of the American Convention, as well as of some instruments of the universal system of human rights and other regional systems of protection such as the European and the African systems.19 The Court has also used the teleological or purposive interpretation. In this regard, the Court has analyzed the purpose of the norms involved in the interpretation, considering that the object and purpose of the treaty and the purposes of the inter-American human rights system are pertinent. Lastly, evolutive interpretation means that: [H]uman rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes over time and present day conditions. […] That evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general 17 See, for example, Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 178, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of Novermber 23, 2012. Series C No. 255, para. 93. 18 Cf. Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, para. 191, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 43. 19 Cf. Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, paras. 191 a 244.