3 idem), effect of the judgment, specific aspects of the processing of minors that incur in behaviors criminally established by law, etcetera. II. COMMUNICATION OF THE REASON FOR THE ARREST 8. The judgment issued by the Court in the Case of López Alvarez v. Honduras (February 1, 2006) focuses on matters of the due process, even when it also takes into account some new subjects that had previously not been dealt with by the InterAmerican Court, as is the case with the violation to the liberty of (thought and) expression referring to the use of the Garifuna language by the victim while he was imprisoned, something that possesses an autonomous entity of its own, and also has a specific interest in the circumstances of the application of the custodial measures, as I will mention infra. 9. The establishment of the subject of the proceedings –I use this expression deliberately; later on I will refer to the process, itself --, that is, the precision and reasonable verification of the elements that explain and give an action of the State legal standing has a deep impact on a person’s rights and liberties, and is a central issue in these matters. It not only justifies interventions that would otherwise be absolutely illegitimate (for example, interferences with a person’s liberty, security, property), and establishes the border between the law and its essential limitations (under the terms traditionally acknowledged and firmly provided by, among other instruments, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man –Article XXVIII—and the American Convention –Articles 27 and 29 through 32--), but it also offers the rational and necessary foundations (although not enough by itself) so that the individual (as a suspect or accused, at its time) may confront those interventions that occur at different stages, under different names and with different circumstances, invariably restrictive of the exercise of rights and liberties. 10. It is inexcusable that any person affected by the persecutory activity of the State know of the motive (and its meaning, with its possible repercussions) of the same in a timely manner, so that he may confront it in an adequate manner through acts of defense, normally oriented in the sense that derives from the knowledge of that motive. I use this last word, not employed in the American Convention, to establish the scope that I believe the expressions “reasons for his detention” and “charge or charges against him”, used in Article 7(4) of the Pact of San Jose have. 11. In essence, the international norm refers to enough information to demonstrate the legitimacy of the state’s actions (administrative or judicial, at their times) and offer the possibility of a timely and adequate defense. It should not be understood that this duty of the State and this right of the individual are satisfied with the reference to stipulations of criminal codes, which may be insufficient or unintelligible for the subject. It is precise that it receives information on the facts attributed to him (as motives for the state’s actions). In a certain way this requirement of the Law (national and international) on human rights, comes to correct the hypothesis –unreal and unequal—which assumes, based on an old and debated presumption, that everybody knows the law and that they are immediately aware that they have observed it or violated it. 12. The Judgment that I now comment distinguishes how it should be done, based on the American Convention, both in the case of an arrest that occurs in compliance with a court order –which supposes previous procedural acts – and the one that occurs