4 Inter-American Court of Human Rights of January 15, 1988, Provisional Measures in the Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz cases; Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of December 7, 1994, Provisional Measures in the Caballero Delgado and Santana case; Orders of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 22, 1995, and April 18, 1997, Provisional Measures in the Blake case; Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of June 30, 1998, and Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of August 29, 1998, both as to the Provisional Measures in the Bámaca Velásquez case); with all the more reason is the adoption of provisional measures justified when it is a petitioner in a contentious case pending before the Court who claims that she fears for her personal integrity. 9. That, on this point, as this Court has already stated, “it is the responsibility of the State to adopt security measures to protect all those who are subject to its jurisdiction; this obligation is even more evident as regards those who are involved in proceedings before the supervisory organs of the American Convention” (cf. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 17, 1999, Provisional Measures in the Digna Ochoa y Plácido et al case, seventh preambular paragraph). 10. That the purpose of provisional measures, under the national legal systems (domestic procedural law) in general, is to preserve the rights of the contending parties, ensuring that the future judgement on merits is not prejudiced by their actions pendente lite. 11. That, under the International Law of Human Rights, the purpose of provisional measures goes further, as, besides their essentially preventive character, they effectively protect fundamental rights, inasmuch as they seek to avoid irreparable damage to persons. 12. That the requests contained in “Having seen” 1b and c (supra) refer to legal proceedings that are not directly linked to the facts of the Constitutional Tribunal case under consideration by this Court and, if these facts were to be submitted to the Court, it would not be in order for it to take a decision with regard to ordering provisional measures, since this would imply prejudging the merits. In view of its specific object and legal nature, the granting of provisional measures may under no circumstances prejudge the merits of a case. 13. That, in accordance with Article 25.4 of the Rules of Procedure, the President of the Court is only authorized to order such urgent measures as may be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of any provisional measures subsequently ordered by the Court at its next period of sessions (cf. inter alia, Order of the President of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of February 10, 1998, in the Paniagua Morales et al and Vásquez et al cases; and Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of July 29, 1997, Provisional Measures in the Cesti Hurtado case). THEREFORE: THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS Based on Article 63.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and on the use