7 VI PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 28. It is necessary to clarify at this time a matter generally related to the observations of the Commission regarding the brief on preliminary objections submitted by the State. The Commission stated in the aforementioned observations that this is not the first time that the Illustrious Government of Peru raises [the] objections [that have been interposed in this case] because, in fact, questions of a similar nature to those to which I respond have been raised already in the Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case. For that reason, in the interest of brevity, I refer, where relevant, to the Commission’s statements in its answering brief in that case as well as to the applicable observations made by the Commission in the application submitted in this Cesti Hurtado Case, which I request be considered as included in this answer. 29. The Commission’s request that the Court consider “where relevant” arguments that were raised in another case, does not contribute to the progress of the proceedings. When the Commission presents its observations to the preliminary objections raised by the State, it should relate them to the particular circumstances of the respective case. Therefore, for the purposes of this judgment, the Court has considered the observations made by the Commission to the objections raised by the State within the framework of this proceeding and in the present stage, without considering those raised in the context of other cases. VII FIRST OBJECTION Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies 30. The first objection raised by the State concerns the alleged lack of the exhaustion of domestic remedies when the Commission admitted for processing the complaint on behalf of the alleged victim, and inappropriate legal action. 31. As grounds for this objection, the State submitted a summary of its interpretation of the facts of the case, and also its arguments, which the Court will hereafter summarize: a) that when the Commission received and admitted the complaint filed by Carmen Judith Cardó Guarderas de Cesti on March 4, 1997, domestic resources had not yet been exhausted, because the main issue of discussion, which is that of the jurisdiction of the military court, cannot be negated by a writ of habeas corpus, not even by the Superior Court of Lima, but rather by means of the procedures set forth in the Code of Military Justice and the Law of the Judicial Authority and by the Supreme Court of Justice. b) that there was no arbitrary imprisonment of Mr. Cesti Hurtado, that the order of detention incorporated the requirements of a judicial order resulting from a customary proceeding, a consistent decision and a written, reasoned warrant rendered by a jurisdictional, constitutionally autonomous and exclusive institution; and c) that on May 2, 1997, two months after the filing of the original petition before the Commission, the military court condemned Mr. Cesti Hurtado to