8 four years of imprisonment, which, in the opinion of the State, demonstrates that the domestic resources had not been exhausted when the complaint was lodged with the Commission. 32. The Court summarizes as follows the arguments of the Commission as to the first objection raised by the Government: a) that the Commission had made reference to this issue in the brief supporting its application, for which reason it referred the Court “inter alia” to paragraphs 56, 57, 65 to 70, 75, and 78 of that brief; b) that the writ of habeas corpus operates as a legal requirement when “lack or absence of [...] due process” is alleged; that this view requires the competence of the court, and that, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy in the case of Mr. Cesti; c) that the American Convention “is violated by even the institution of a proceeding before an incompetent judge or court”; d) that the issuance of an arrest order by an incompetent authority or official is a circumstance that threatens liberty, a circumstance that, in accordance with the Constitution of Peru, can be attacked by means of a writ of habeas corpus; e) that “the Convention is violated by a threat to the freedom of a person, from which can then be deduced the rest of the related rights, according to that set forth in Article 200 of the Peruvian Constitution.” 33. Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention establishes that for a petition or communication lodged with the Inter-American Commission in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 of the Convention to be inadmissible, it is necessary that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. The issue of exhaustion was raised before the Commission, which determined, in its Report No. 45/97 dated October 16, 1997 that the domestic remedies had been exhausted with the decision on the writ of habeas corpus in the last instance. What the Court now must decide is whether the imprisonment and the fine imposed on Cesti Hurtado resulted from legal due process. This is essentially a substantive question, whereas the objection of non exhaustion of domestic resources is procedural in character and of pure admissibility. As the State’s arguments go to the merits, the Court will consider them in its examination of the merits of the case. Therefore, the Court rejects the first preliminary objection as inadmissible. VIII SECOND AND THIRD OBJECTIONS Lack of Competence and Jurisdiction, and Res Judicata 34. The second objection interposed by the State concerns jurisdiction and competence. 35. On this point, the State argues that: