94. As for the effectiveness of the remedy, the Court has established that for such an effective remedy to exist, it is not enough that it be provided by the Constitution or by law or that it be formally recognized, but rather it must be truly effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress. A remedy that proves illusory because of the general conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particular circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered effective. 75 95. Moreover, the Court has noted that “Article 25(1) of the Convention contemplates the duty of the States Parties to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective recourse against acts that violate their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness presupposes that, in addition to the existence of formal remedies, there be results or answers to the violations of rights enshrined in the Convention, in the Constitution, or in laws. […] The process should lead to the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial ruling, by the proper application of this ruling.” 76 96. Specifically, the Court deems that to maintain the effet util of the decisions, the domestic tribunals, in rendering decisions in favor of the rights of people and in ordering reparations, should establish in a clear and precise manner according to its competence - the scope of the reparations and the method for their implementation thereof. According to the standards of this Court and the international law of human rights, the scope of these measures must be comprehensive in nature and, if possible, return the person to the position they were in before the violation occurred (restitutio in integrum). Among these measures are, where applicable, restitution of property or rights, rehabilitation, satisfaction, compensation and guarantees of non-repetition, inter alia. 77 97. In this case, having established that the unconstitutionality action was the most suitable remedy to redress the rights alleged by Mr. Mejía Idrovo, the Court notes that the ruling of March 12, 2002, of the Constitutional Tribunal, while declaring the executive decrees of discharge and suspension unconstitutional, as well as ordering, in general, that the harm caused to the alleged victim be repaired, it lacked precision and clarity to determine the extent of the reparations and their method of implementation. Subsequently, the Resolution of the President of the Tribunal of May 30, 2002 - which showed the irregularities already analyzed (supra para. 53, 78, and 79)--, contributed to the confusion regarding the scope of that decision by restricting its application in a unilateral manner, declaring it as nonretroactive and thereby preventing the reinstatement of the plaintiff to the Armed 75 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez V. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, supra note 12, para. 93; Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, para. 140, and Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. V. Perú, supra note 19, para. 75. 76 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. V. Panamá. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No 104. para. 73; Cf. Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”) V. Perú. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009 Series C No. 198, para. 69, and Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. V. Perú, supra note 19, para. 75. 77 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez V. Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, paras. 25 and 26; Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) V. México. Preliminar Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 450, and Case of Barreto Leiva V. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 128. 30