2. In its answering brief, Colombia indicated that “[g]iven the characteristics of the matters that the State is submitting as preliminary objections, the State requests […] that Article 42(5) and [42](6) of the Rules of Procedure [of the Court] be applied.” Moreover, it made the same request in relation to the alleged nullity “of the communication whereby the Commission […] advised that it was joindering the admissibility and merits stages,” and also of “Report on Admissibility and Merits No. 137/11, because this document is the result of [the said decision to joinder the stages].” According to the State, this joinder meant that Colombia did not have certainty about the purpose of the dispute. Consequently, it indicated that, given the characteristics of the alleged nullity, it was requesting that the Court “decide to hold a hearing that would allow the State to explain to the Court the legal and factual grounds that led it to request this procedural action.” 3. In the brief received on March 22, 2013, Colombia reiterated its request to hold “an independent hearing, prior to the hearing on [the eventual] merits, reparations and costs,” indicating that “[t]he hearing was essential to avoid a serious infringement of the right to defense of the Colombian State, as a result of the procedural flaws during the quasijurisdictional proceedings previously exhausted by the Commission.” In addition, it indicated that “the extremely complex nature of the case in question requires that the Court examine the State’s requests concerning nullity and objections before dealing with the merits and the reparations and that, following this, it hold an independent hearing that allows the State to present its substantive arguments on the case, and the Court to focus on examining them.” 4. The representatives argued that, according to the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the holding of a special hearing for the preliminary objections “constitutes an exception.” Thus, they indicated that “the State has not substantiated the special circumstances of the case that would justify a differentiated treatment of matters of admissibility.” For the representatives, the State’s arguments “do not constitute an exceptional circumstance that would warrant differentiated treatment in this case.” In addition, they underlined that “28 years have passed since the acts were committed, and during this time, the victims and their next of kin have been waiting to obtain justice.” The representatives therefore asked that the Court reject the State’s request. 5. Meanwhile, the Commission indicated that the Court’s Rules of Procedure reveal that holding a special hearing for the preliminary objections is exceptional. It considered that this “interpretation is consistent with the practice […] for more than 11 years, [according to which] the Inter-American Court has heard the matters relating to the preliminary objections and those relating to the merits, reparations and costs at a single hearing.” It also indicated that “to accept that the concept of ‘essential’ in the […] Rules of Procedure is related to ‘due process’ for the States, would be equivalent to indicating that the reiterated application of the regulatory norms that permit holding a hearing, as well as the wellestablished practice [of the Court], have been contrary to the principle of due process.” In addition, the Commission considered that the State had not explained “the specific reasons why the […] complexity [of the case] justifies the separation of the hearings.” Based on the foregoing, the Commission considered that “there are insufficient reasons to deal with this case in a way that differs from the Court’s consistent practice.” 6. This Court has established that, based on the principle of procedural economy, the Court is wont to hold a single hearing on preliminary objections and the eventual stages of merits, reparations and costs, except in extremely exceptional cases when it considers it 2