JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE AND A. ABREU-BURELLI 1. By will of fate the last Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights this year, on the eve of the year 2000, was to fall upon a situation which affects a particularly vulnerable sector of the population of the countries of Latin America: that of the sufferings of the children in the streets. Paragraph 144 of the present Judgment, in our view, faithfully reflects the current state of evolution of the right to life in the framework of the International Law of Human Rights in general, and under the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 4) in particular. It affirms the fundamental character of the right to life, which, besides being non-derogable, requires positive measures of protection on the part of the State (Article 1.1 of the American Convention). 2. The right to life implies not only the negative obligation not to deprive anyone of life arbitrarily, but also the positive obligation to take all necessary measures to secure that that basic right is not violated. Such interpretation of the right to life, so as to comprise positive measures of protection on the part of the State, finds support nowadays in international case-law as well as doctrine52. There can no longer be any doubt that the fundamental right to life belongs to the domain of jus cogens53. 3. The right to life cannot keep on being conceived restrictively, as it was in the past, by reference only to the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of physical life. We believe that there are distinct ways to deprive a person arbitrarily of life: when his death is provoked directly by the unlawful act of homicide, as well as when circumstances are not avoided which likewise lead to the death of persons as in the cas d'espèce. In the present Villagrán Morales versus Guatemala case (Merits), pertaining to the death of children by police agents of the State, there is the aggravating circumstance that the life of the children was already devoid of any meaning; that is, the victimized children were already deprived of creating and developing a project of life and even to seek out a meaning for their own existence. 1. Cf., in this respect, e.g., B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), The Right to Life in International Law, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1985, pp. 1-314; J. G. C. van Aggelen, Le rôle des organisations internationales dans la protection du droit à la vie, Bruxelles, E. Story-Scientia, 1986, pp. 1-104; D. Prémont and F. Montant (eds.), Actes du Symposium sur le droit à la vie - Quarante ans après l'adoption de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme: Évolution conceptuelle, normative et jurisprudentielle, Genève, CID, 1992, pp. 1-91; A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Human Rights and the Environment", Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges (ed. J. Symonides), Paris/Aldershot, UNESCO/Dartmouth, 1998, pp. 117-153; F. Przetacznik, "The Right to Life as a Basic Human Right", 9 Revue des droits de l'homme/Human Rights Journal (1976) pp. 585-609. And cf. the general comments ns. 6/1982 and 14/1984 of the Human Rights Committee, under the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reproduced in: United Nations, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, of 15.08.1997, pp. 6-7 and 18-19. 2. Cf., in this respect, e.g., W. Paul Gormley, "The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens", The Right to Life in International Law, op. cit. supra n. (1), pp. 120159; Y. Dinstein, "The Erga Omnes Applicability of Human Rights", 30 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1992) pp. 16-37; and cf., in general, inter alia, Alfred Verdross, "Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law", 60 American Journal of International Law (1966), pp. 55-63; Charles de Visscher, "Positivisme et jus cogens", 75 Revue générale de Droit international public (1971) pp. 5-11; and cf. also: International Court of Justice, South West Africa Cases (2nd. phase, Ethiopia and Liberia versus South Africa), Dissenting Opinion of Judge K. Tanaka, ICJ Reports (1966) p. 298: "(...) surely the law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the jus cogens".