autonomously, at least, to the main arguments of the defense related to: (i) the alleged lack of constitutive effects of the preventive measure adopted, and (ii) that the decision of the judges who were removed supposedly gave a plausible legal interpretation of the scope of the preventive amparo. The Court considered that the reasoning should act as a guarantee that would allow a distinction to be made between a “reasonable difference in legal interpretations,” and an “inexcusable miscarriage of justice” that would adversely affect the suitability of the judge to exercise his or her functions, so that judges are not punished for adopting duly founded legal positions, even if these positions differ from those held by review bodies.13 The Court concluded that, “[s]ince that was not the case, the reality was that the disciplinary proceeding ended up by being a mere formality” and, consequently, the obligation to state the reasons for the punishment of removal was ignored, thereby violating the ‘due guarantees” ordered in Article 8(1) of the American Convention.14 11. The Court also noted that the victims offered a probative element and the disciplinary body never ruled on its admission, or conducted the necessary steps to assess it. The Court considered that the said evidence was the only one offered by the victims and its purpose was to clarify a decisive aspect of the case; in other words that the measure of amparo granted by the judges could not have produced constitutive effects and that, therefore, there was no inexcusable miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Court considered that the disciplinary body should have, at least, provided a minimum response, accepting or refusing the production of the said evidence and even ordering the victims themselves to obtain it. By not doing so, the “due [judicial] guarantees” of the victims were ignored.15 12. Regarding the effectiveness of the remedies, the Court noted that the remedies in this case were filed against two actions: (i) the preventive measure of suspension imposed by the CFRSJ in the context of the disciplinary investigation for the mishandling of a case file, and (ii) the sanction of removal imposed by the said disciplinary body owing to the perpetration of an “inexcusable miscarriage of justice.”16 Regarding the application for amparo against the decision ordering the suspension of justices Apitz and Rocha, the Court concluded that Article 25(1) had been violated in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention, because this remedy did not operate with the promptness required to address claims relating to presumed human rights violations.17 Regarding the appeal to a higher body filed against the decision ordering the removal, the Court considered that it violated the right to a reasonable time established in Article 8(1) of the Convention, because Venezuela offered no explanation of the reasons why the Supreme Court of Justice took more than nine months to decide the matter.18 In relation to the appeal for annulment and the measure of preventive amparo against the sanction of removal, the Court analyzed each remedy independently, indicating that: (i) regarding the preventive amparo, Article 25((1) of the Convention was violated because the SPA took more than three years to rule on the admissibility of this preventive amparo and the time that elapsed could not be justified in any way in order to ensure the promptness of the amparo,19 and (ii) regarding the appeal 13 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 90. 14 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 91. 15 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 94. 16 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 149. 17 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 156. 18 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, paras. 160 and 161. 19 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 171. 5