3 Measures.14 In addition, the Commission’s precautionary measures are based upon procedural rather than conventional provisions, and should not delay —sometimes indefinitely— the application of Provisional Protection Measures ordered by the Court, which are based upon conventional provisions. 10. As I stated in the above-mentioned Concurring Opinion, “in any and all circumstances, protection imperatives must prevail over apparent institutional zeal”, even more so in the light of circumstances of “chronic violence”.15 The Commission’s obstinacy in its practices regarding provisional measures may, in some cases, bring about negative consequences to potential victims and cause them further hindrance. In certain cases, it might amount to denial of international justice. 11. Thirdly, a Commission’s denial of provisional measures should be duly justified. The decisions of the Commission and the Court involving precautionary and provisional measures, respectively, must always be duly justified, as a guarantee of observance of the adversary principle —which is a general principle of law— so that petitioners have assurances that the issue they have brought up has been duly and carefully considered by the international instance, and so that the meaning of its decision is clear16 (even more so under alleged circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency involving the likelihood of irreparable damage to the human person). 12. A denial of precautionary measures by the Commission must always and necessarily be duly justified. Furthermore, an additional, similarly ungrounded denial of a request for Provisional Measures to the Court by the Commission provides the potential victims, as subjects of the International Law of Human Rights, with grounds for seeking relief from the Court in order to obtain such Provisional Measures. Otherwise, there could be a denial of international justice. 13. Fourthly, if the petitioner, after two denials by the Commission, seeks relief from the Court and this, in turn, fails to adopt any measure on the alleged grounds of a lack of conventional (since the case is proceeding before the Commission and not before the Court) and procedural basis —even if it does so with a view to filling this apparent legal gap and changing the current state of things (based on praeter legem equity considerations) — there could be a denial of international justice. In two recent opportunities, I have allowed myself to call the Court's attention to this issue.17 14. At the moment, I cannot perceive any inclination in the Commission or the Court towards making the quantum leap I propose. What is more, I think that, if the present apathy (as regards this specific issue) I perceive in the two bodies responsible for enforcing the American Convention had prevailed in 2000, perhaps some of the procedural changes towards furthering individuals’ direct access to the American 14 . Cf. Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACHR], Order of November 17, 2005 Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of FEBEM regarding Brazil. Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, Para. 3. 15 . Ibid., para. 5. 16 . Cf. [Various Authors] Le principe du contradictoire devant les jurisdictions internationals, H. Ruiz Fabri and J. M. Sorel, eds. Paris, Pédone, 2004, pp. 14, 33, 81, 86, 118 and 168). 17 . Cf. IACHR, Matter of Brothers Dante, Jorge and José Peirano Basso v. Uruguay, letter of July 7, 2006 from Judges A. A. Cançado Trindade and M. E. Ventura-Robles to the Court’s President, doc. CDHS/1181, pp. 1–2; matter of Loretta Ortiz Ahlf and Other Mexican Citizens v. Mexico, Letter of September 19, 2006 from Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade to the Court's acting President, doc. Corte IDH/1641, p. 1.