children under 18 years of age these requirements are not a necessary condition to characterize trafficking; iii) For the purpose of any kind of exploitation.438 B.6. Forced or compulsory labor 291. Regarding forced or compulsory labor, prohibited in Article 6(2) of the American Convention, the Court has already ruled on the meaning and scope of this provision in the case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia.439 In that judgment, the Court accepted the definition of forced labor contained in Article 2(1) of ILO Convention No. 29, which stipulates that: [T]he term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily. 292. In the said judgment, the Court considered that the definition of forced or compulsory labor included two basic elements: that the work or service was exacted “by threat of a penalty,” and that it was performed unwillingly.440 Also, in the circumstances of that case, the Court considered that, in order to constitute a violation of Article 6(2) of the Convention it would be necessary that the presumed violation could be attributed to State agents, either by their direct participation in the facts or by their acquiescence to them. 441 The Court will now analyze the facts of this case in light of these three criteria. 293. Regarding “threat of a penalty,” this many consist, inter alia, in the real and actual presence of intimidation that can assume multiple forms and degrees, the most extreme of which are those that entail coercion, physical violence, isolation, or restriction of movement, as well as death threats addressed at the victims or their family members. 442 And, with regard to the “unwillingness to perform the work or service,” this consists in the absence of consent or of free choice at the time of beginning or continuing the situation of forced labor. This can occur for different reasons, such as the unlawful deprivation of liberty, deception or psychological coercion.443 In the case of attribution to State agents, the Court considers that this element is restricted to the obligation to respect the prohibition of forced labor, which was relevant in the case of the Ituango Massacres due to the specific circumstances of the case. However, that element cannot be retained when the alleged violation refers to the obligation to guarantee and to prevent harm to a human right established in the American Convention; thus, it is not necessary that the violation could be attributed to State agents in order to constitute forced labor. In this regard, in the next section, the Court will establish the State’s obligations in relation to the prohibition of slavery, servitude, trafficking in persons and forced labor. B.7. The facts of this case in light of the international standards 294. The Court will now examine the facts of this case to determine whether they correspond to any of the situations defined in the preceding sections. After determining the “Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude and the removal of organs.” Protocol of Palermo, Article 3. Written expert opinion of Jean Allain, evidence file, folios 14986 and 14987. 438 439 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, paras. 155 to 160. 440 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, para. 160. 441 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, para. 160. 442 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, para. 161. 443 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, para. 164. 76