23 postulate candidates for elected public office, does not violate the Constitution or international treaties […].” IFE stated that “[t]he right to be postulated and to be elected to an elected office at the federal level can only be exercised through one of the national political parties that are registered with the Federal Electoral Institute,” and also that the COFIPE “indicates the time frame for the registration of candidacies for President of the United Mexican States, which runs from January 1 to 15 of the electoral year.” 83. On March 29, 2004, the alleged victim filed an application for amparo against this ruling of the Federal Electoral Institute before the Seventh District Administrative Court of the Federal District. Mr. Castañeda Gutman based his application for amparo on the following arguments: (a) violation of the individual guarantees of the exercise of freedom to work and participate in the development of the democratic regime on the national political scene; (b) violation of the individual guarantee of equality before the law, and (c) violation of the individual guarantee of freedom of association, all based on the Mexican Constitution. 84. On March 30, 2004, the Seventh District Administrative Court of the Federal District, in its decision to admit the application for amparo, indicated that, “in general, the application for guarantees [amparo] in which an attempt is made to infer rights of a political nature shall be inadmissible, except in cases in which individual rights are claimed therein. [C]onsequently, and in order not to judge this circumstance a priori, based on Article 114 [and others] of the Amparo Act, [this court] considers it in order to admit the application for amparo […].” Subsequently, on July 16, 2004, the Seventh District Administrative Court of the Federal District decided to declare the application for amparo filed by the alleged victim inadmissible, owing to “the constitutional inadmissibility arising from paragraph 3 of Article 105(II) of the Constitution, [which] establishes[…] that the only remedy to allege that electoral laws are not in accordance with the Constitution is the unconstitutionality proceeding; a provision that […] harmonizes with the legal inadmissibility contained in Article 73(VII) of the Amparo Act.” 85. On August 2, 2004, Mr. Castañeda Gutman filed an appeal for review against the Seventh Court. As this appeal raised legal and constitutional issues, the Fourteenth Collegiate Administrative Court of the First Circuit, to which the hearing of this appeal corresponded, decided the legal issues in a judgment of November 11, 2004, and proposed that the Supreme Court should exercise its powers to rule on constitutional matters. 86. On August 8 and 16, 2005, the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice confirmed the appealed judgment and decided to declare the application for amparo it was reviewing inadmissible based on Articles 175, 176, 177(1)(e), and 178 of the COFIPE, the constitutionality of which was being challenged by the alleged victim, without examining the merits of the issue. The Supreme Court also decided to dismiss the application for amparo regarding the decision of the Executive Director of Privileges and Political Parties of IFE contained in the communication of March 11, 2004, which had motivated Jorge Castañeda Gutman’s action for amparo. The Supreme Court considered that “[…] the authority to decide on contradictions between electoral laws and the Federal Constitution is entirely restricted by constitutional mandate to the plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice, while the Electoral Tribunal shall decide any other act or decision or the interpretation of a constitutional provision, provided that this interpretation is not to verify that an electoral law conforms to the Constitution”; because “[…] the intention is to give certainty to the rules that govern the electoral process, by establishing a constitutional means of control called the unconstitutionality proceedings; […] therefore, federal and local legislative bodies are obliged to enact electoral laws at least 90 days before an electoral process takes place so that, should the Supreme Court declare that the norm is invalid, there is time for the