16 is done to her child; a suffering so natural and evident that it does not even need to be proved – as the case law of the Inter-American Court has maintained – contrary to the case of the suffering caused to other next of kin, the suffering of a mother is presumed juris tantum. If this is so, what substantive difference is there between the suffering caused to the direct victim of the action of the agent and the violation of the mental or moral integrity of the close next of kin, who suffers this as soon as the unlawful conduct of that agent occurs? 59. It is evident that, as I mentioned a few lines previously, we are faced with a fragile, elusive dividing line between those who are recognized as direct or indirect victims, and those who are not always classified as such, but benefit from the reparations decided by the Court. In some cases, this line seems clear; in others, it is particularly hazy. If a person is affected by the violation committed, should they not be considered a victim? – because they truly suffer from the fact that a protected possession is affected and a specific right established in the Convention is infringed – even though, technically, they are classified as an indirect victim? And if they are not victims, how should they be classified, and where does their right to receive some compensation arise from? I return to the example I gave in the preceding paragraph: the closest relative of the person who loses his life or suffers severe harm, endures great pain and suffering as a result of this and, consequently, his mental integrity (which is one of the possessions protected by Article 5(1) of the American Convention) is affected, even though the agent who perpetrated the violation did not propose to affect this integrity. Even so, through his unlawful conduct, the latter has caused this suffering to occur and, thus, has violated the mental integrity of the third person. 60. The fact that some compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused to other persons is ordered, regardless of the non-pecuniary damage caused to the immediate and chosen victim, underscores that the former have a legal title that gives them a right to this compensation, a title that relates to the one possessed by those who are expressly considered as victims. The right to compensation arises from a presumption that is the same in both cases: they have suffering harm to their mental integrity, owing to an unlawful external conduct by a State agent, which violates the American Convention. 61. The protection system constructed by the Pact of San José makes no distinction between direct and indirect effects, nor does it take into account their mediate or immediate nature. There is a single source of the harm: the violation of a right; in this case, the right to mental integrity. The juridical effect for the State is the same: the obligation to repair the harm caused unlawfully. The decision of the Court is identical in both cases: the payment of a certain amount as compensation for non-pecuniary damage, to alleviate the pain caused. In view of the foregoing, I believe that the Court’s approach is correct when examining this problem in the present case and deciding that “the next of kin of Myrna Mack Chang must be considered victims because the State has violated their mental and moral integrity” (para. 232 of the judgment). 62. It is true that reconsideration of these concepts may extend the universe of victims, but it is also true that many persons are affected by a fact that violates a right and suffer impairment of the juridical possessions that the Convention protects. If we review the case law of the Inter-American Court, we will see that there are a large number of reparations of a compensatory nature motivated by non-pecuniary damage caused immediately to the person who is first the alleged victim and, subsequently, the proven victim. There are also such reparations to subjects whose