5 21. On the one hand, we could consider that the phrase mentioned in the preceding paragraph does not comprise an element of the crime definition, but rather an explanation or thought of the legislator to recall the aim that the perpetrators of the crime of forced disappearance had in mind and its normal effects: avoidance of the ordinary controlling force of justice aimed at providing personal security. The wording of the paragraph itself leads to the following conclusion: indeed, the final part of the rule reads: “thereby impeding” and not “in a manner that impedes,” as it should have read had one more element of the crime definition been in mind. 22. On the other hand, if the wording of the Inter-American Convention I am now analyzing is deemed to refer to an element of the crime definition, that circumstance would not hinder the criminalization of the conduct of forced disappearance merely on the grounds that, in theory, the legal remedies and procedural safeguards to protect personal freedom (the appropriate remedies and safeguards, in a general and impersonal sense) remain available. Moreover, the crime of forced disappearance would be committed all the same, even if, hypothetically, it were possible for a third party to resort to a given remedy. The important thing is to continue allowing unrestricted and prompt access to remedies and safeguards that effectively ensure that the violated right is redressed and that the holder of that right is properly protected. In other words, ―as suggested by the United Nations project― the victim should not be deprived of legal protection. Obviously, the idea is that the person should not be deprived of the safeguards that the appropriate legal system should make available to him or her. 23. The treatment of this matter is different in all other instruments, which were also mentioned in the judgment of the Inter-American Court and to which I have made reference in this Opinion. The final sentence of Article 2 of the aforementioned UN project is probably more adequate, since the relation established between the elements of the crime definition is even clearer. It establishes a relation between the conduct of the agent and its consequences regarding the personal security afforded the victim under the law: “depriving (the victim) of the protection of the law.” Moreover, the Statute of the ICC incorporates that aspect as a subjective element of the crime definition. Indeed, it mentions “the intention” of the perpetrator of “removing them (the individuals deprived of their freedom) from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” 24. This type of considerations, as applied to the instant case, motivated the Inter-American Court to examine Article 320 of the Criminal Code of Peru. We should bear in mind that the aforementioned Article punishes “[a] public official or servant who deprives an individual of his liberty, by ordering or carrying out any act that results in the individual’s duly proven disappearance, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen years and disqualification from office, pursuant to Article 36(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.” This concise wording leaves ample space for criticism and deserves ―from my point of view, hence this separate concurring Opinion of mine― a decision such as that rendered by the Court. Let us see. 25. Firstly, the reference to the conduct is not consistent with the 1994 Convention and, in any case, it is obscure. Article 320 refers to the ordering or carrying out of an act, thus involving another issue that should not have been included in the wording of the crime definition: criminal involvement, either as