13 47. Even in the fifties (in 1959), Pieter N. Drost published his works The Crime of State, in two volumes, the first one dedicated to what he called “humanicide”, and the second to genocide. When referring to the first category, he remembered the existence of universal standards of reason and justice, and defined humanicide as a Crime of State, perpetrated by State agents abusing public power, in detriment of individuals, and in violation of human rights (such as those enshrined in Articles 3-21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), defying the Constitutional State. 38 48. In his judgment, both acts and omissions can constitute crimes of State, compromising the State’s aggravated international responsibility – in reason of its criminality – as a legal person, which must assume the juridical consequences of said crimes. 39 P.N. Drost concluded that it should protect individuals from “humanicide” as a crime of State, and, since the latter could even “destroy the international legal system”, it should be punished and inhibited. 40 49. At the end of the XX century, the International Criminal Tribunal ad hoc for the former Yugoslavia, in its Judgments of the case of Tadic, of 05.07.1997 (Trial Chamber) and of 07.15.1999 (Appeals Chamber), stated – in its first Judgment – that "the obligations of individuals under International Humanitarian Law are independent and apply without prejudice to any questions of the responsibility of States under International Law" (para. 573); the Tribunal added – in its second Judgment – that the acts of the individuals in question "are attributed to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may also generate individual criminal responsibility." (para. 144) The determination of an individual’s international criminal responsibility does not, therefore, free the State of its international responsibility. 50. In my recent General Course on Public International Law given in the Academy of International Law of La Haya (2005), I allowed myself to present my position in the sense that the crime of State does exist, and it has juridical consequences. Likewise, I related its sanction and prevention with the fundamental or superior interests of the international community as a whole and of the international juridical legal system. 41 I did it based on my experience in this Court, reiterating the reflections I have developed in this sense in successive Opinions in Judgments regarding certain cases decided upon by this Court in the previous years. 42 51. There have been occasions in which the crimes of State have been committed beyond national boundaries, on a truly inter-state scale. In this sense, in my recent Concurring Opinion in the case of Goiburú et al. versus Paraguay (Judgment of 09.22.2006), I allowed myself to state that . P.N. Drost, The Crime of State - Book I: Humanicide, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1959, pp. 262-263, 347348, 218-219, and 318. 38 . Ibid., pp. 283-284, 290, 294, and 296. . Ibid., pp. 36 and 325. 39 40 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "General Course on Public International Law - International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium", 317 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye (2005) cap. XV (in press). 41 . 42 Cf. supra, paragraph 39 of this Concurring Opinion.